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THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE INDONESIAN ARMY*
Ruth McVey
At the end of the revolution of 1945-1949, the Indonesian army 
held a place of great power. Its leaders had refused from the outset 
to accept the principle of civilian control over military affairs, 
and the course of the revolution did nothing to convince them that 
they had been wrong in maintaining their independence. In their eyes, 
the army had borne the brunt of the struggle against the Dutch, while 
the politicians had quarrelled among themselves, negotiated conces­
sions to the Netherlands forces, and even rebelled against the Republic 
itself. For the military leaders, the army embodied the spirit as 
well as the fighting strength of the revolution, and, if they had no 
specific political program for the post-independence period, their 
ideas of what Indonesia should be were at least as coherent and 
strongly held as those of the politicians in charge of the government.
There was no compelling reason for the parliamentary system, 
which refused the army a legitimate political role, to be sure of 
military obedience, and there were no forces in the civil society 
that could be expected to offer effective resistance if the army 
attempted to impose its will. Liberal democratic ideas and institu­
tions were of very recent origin and uncertain authority; they had 
been chosen as the nation's governing principles because the Dutch- 
educated civilian elite identified them with the modernity towards 
which they thought independent Indonesia must strive, because liberal 
democratic forms were valuable assets for securing Western recogni­
tion and aid, and because the parliamentary system offered a means 
of negotiating differences between diverse elements of the civilian 
elite, no one part of which was in a position to claim the sole 
right to rule. This elite consisted of a quite small group of 
politically influential people, mostly clustered in the capital and 
with little claim on the loyalties of the population at large, and 
it is doubtful whether the frustration’ of its preferences would have 
evoked a significant mass reaction. Sukarno, who was later able to 
call on his popularity among the masses and within the military it­
self to keep the army leaders from asserting too strongly their 
claims to power, was in the beginning of the 1950's at the low point 
of his influence. His prestige among the military had been dimmed 
by his failure to avoid capture during the 1948 Dutch attack on the 
Republic, and his political lustre diminished by the active role 
played since 1948 by Vice-President Hatta. No other civilian leader 
had sufficient stature to outbid the army leaders on nationalist 
grounds. The Left, which had achieved significant mass support 
during the revolution and which at that time had stressed the need 
for civilian control over the military, had been shattered organiza­
tionally and morally by the 1948 clash between government and
* This is the first part of a two-part article. The second part will 
appear in the October 1971 issue.
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Communist forces. The only other ideological force with political 
leadership and a mass base, Islam, was unlikely to offer effective 
resistance to army rule except on the basis of the already existing 
rebellion for an Islamic state, and it is doubtful if the insurgent 
forces would have been greatly augmented by an army takeover that 
did not declare hostility to Islam.
Nor were the civilian cadres essential to running the state so 
thoroughly in favor of parliamentary rule that they might have been 
expected to sabotage any army dominated system. The small but in­
fluential group of technocratic administrators favored Western 
political ideas but were also impressed by the military's emphasis 
on efficiency and modernization, and, from a very early point, they 
showed themselves to be of two minds regarding the subordination of 
the military to the politicians. The bureaucratic elite of the 
pamong pradja (civil service) could have been expected to look with 
distaste on the prospect of submitting to the socially upstart 
military, but its opinion of the civilian politicians was not much 
higher than its view of the soldiers. The threat posed to its posi­
tion by the extension of democratic institutions to regional and 
local government was keenly appreciated.
As for the army leaders themselves, they had less regard for 
the Dutch political example than did the civilian political chiefs; 
younger and generally of somewhat inferior social position, they 
had had less exposure to Western education and political ideas.
Their formative ideological experience had been acquired in the 
Japanese occupation and revolution rather than in colonial politics; 
they had thus not been involved in the struggle to secure the demo­
cratic rights recognized in principle by the Dutch, which had been 
the focus of most legal nationalist activity and had made those rights 
seem particularly important to the Indonesian politicians. Their 
own experience had made them suspicious of institutions derived from 
the West, particularly of the parliamentary system, which offered 
them nothing but the prospect of losing their independence from 
civilian control. Nonetheless, they accepted parliamentary rule 
at the outset and, in spite of the great tensions that marked their 
relationship to parliament in the 1950's and to Sukarno thereafter, 
they did not move forcefully to establish their own claims to rule 
until 1965.
As we shall see, this fifteen years' modesty was the product of 
accident as much as design, but it is nonetheless significant, given 
the great strains endured by Indonesian society in that time, that no 
more determined effort to establish military hegemony was made. What 
I should like to do here is to consider one of the reasons for this, 
namely the diffusion of power within the military itself. For the 
army was by no means united at the end of the revolution, and the 
effort to determine who was to lead it and how power should be divided 
between the high command and other, subordinate but powerful officers, 
was to consume much of the military leaders' energy and to restrict 
their ability to use the army for political ends. Because most of 
the changes that I wish to describe had their origin in the events of 
the 1950's, most of this essay will concern that period, but I shall 
also indicate the main lines of their continuation in later times.
My emphasis will be the internal development of the army, and so I 
shall treat its relations with civilian affairs only in passing.
133
The Revolutionary Heritage
The initial force from which the Indonesian army sprang was the 
Peta (Pembela Tanah Air, or Fatherland Defense Corps), a paramilitary 
body created in 1943 in the expectation of an Allied invasion of 
Japanese occupied Java. Nominally, Indonesian civilians of nationalist 
or religious note commanded its battalions, but they had little to do 
with its actual working, and real control and ideological influence 
lay in its Japanese trainers.1 The Peta mobilized youth from a broad 
social range', but in selecting platoon and squad leaders (who were 
eventually to form the backbone of the revolutionary officer corps), 
the Japanese naturally chose those who were better educated and 
equipped to lead. Most of these Peta non-coms had had some secondary 
school education, and this meant that they came from the few families 
that were sufficiently wealthy and modern-minded to give their sons 
advanced Western schooling. Similarly, those without a Peta back­
ground who became officers during the revolution tended to have had 
some secondary education and sufficient organizational knowledge to 
enable them to assume technical, administrative, or command posts.
Those revolutionary officers who had no such qualifications and whose 
status rested entirely on derring-do and popularity with their men 
were in a very vulnerable position once the fighting was over. They 
were usually among the first victims of the rationalization efforts, 
and after the revolution they were often to be found among veterans 
but increasingly rarely among active officers.
The officer corps was thus composed almost from the start of 
people drawn largely from the more privileged strata of Indonesian 
society. They did not, however, come from the highly advantaged group 
of the university-educated which served in the top nationalist leader­
ship during the revolution; only very few came from families of 
aristocratic background, although a small but important group of 
senior officers, particularly in the Siliwangi Division of West Java, 
was drawn from the lesser ranks of the traditional bureaucratic 
elite.2 The tendency for officers to be of somewhat lower social
1. For the formation and character of the Peta, see Raden Gatot 
Mangkupradja, "The Peta and My Relations with the Japanese,"
Indonesia, No. 5 (April 1968), pp. 105-134; Benedict R. O'G.
Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics 1945-1946,"
(Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1967), pp. 22-27, 345-348;
Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in 
J. J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped 
Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 186- 
194. The Peta was organized only to battalion level, as it was 
intended to act as a decentralized guerrilla force. This enhanced 
Japanese control but added to the difficulties of establishing 
precedence and effective coordination in the formation of the 
revolutionary army.
2. For a discussion of the social background of Peta members, see 
Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution," pp. 26-27. The higher proportion 
of socially and educationally advantaged officers in the Siliwangi 
Division derived in good part from the fact that Bandung and 
Batavia were principal centers of residence and education for the 
Western educated Indonesian elite in the colonial period. Indonesian 
youths who attended Dutch-language schools in those cities were 
required, along with resident Europeans, to participate in the civil
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status than their civilian counterparts continued into the post­
revolutionary period. In the parliamentary years, it lent something 
of a class tone to military grumblings at the incompetence of civilian 
politicians. Later, when military officers had assumed many govern­
mental functions (and were taken up by civilian elite families anxious 
to make an alliance with the powerful parvenus), it exacerbated ten­
sions within the army as a result of resentment by officers who did 
not experience similar social advancement and who held that those of 
their colleagues who did had corrupted themselves.
Because of the social connotations of advanced education, and 
because of its scarcity and value in the army's formative period, 
the position of officers who came from the Western educated social 
elite was both powerful and delicate. Their ability to deal with 
administrative problems, Republic-level politics, and Dutch counter­
parts brought them into top positions in the course of the war for 
independence. They tended to occupy general staff positions in the 
years thereafter, where they formed a well-knit clique; their 
Europeanized life style made them particularly visible, and they 
easily became the target of anti-Western charges by their opponents 
within and without the army.
It was natural that leaders whose claims to primacy rested on 
superior education and expertise would emphasize the value of this 
and give advancement to subordinates of similar background. More­
over, a stress on "modernization" and technical upgrading fitted in with 
the style of the political leaders of the immediate post-revolutionary 
years, who emphasized the restoration of hierarchy and order and the 
limiting of social demands in the name of reconstruction. These 
leaders and their equivalents in the officer corps represented what 
Herbert Feith has called the "administrator" style of Indonesian 
politics, as opposed to the expressive "solidarity-maker" approach 
embodied above all by Sukarno. In some ways, too, the tension 
between professional and revolutionary military styles can be seen 
as a version of the dichotomy between "red" and "expert" familiar 
to post-revolutionary Communism, in which emphasis on the revolu­
tionary remaking of mankind has battled against stress on technological 
advance.
One way in which the army leaders might have sought to increase 
the expertise of their forces and to reduce their own isolation as 
a relatively Westernized group was to allow the judicious promotion 
of elements from the large body of colonial army (KNIL) members that 
the Republic was obliged to employ under the treaty ending the war 
with the Dutch. However, revolutionary soldiers threatened with 3
defense corps established shortly before the Japanese invasion, 
and some of them later entered the Peta. In addition, Bandung 
contained an officer training school for the Netherlands Indies 
army established after the German occupation of Holland; some who 
had been studying there stayed on in West Java after the Japanese 
invasion and ended up in the Siliwangi Division. See also John 
R. W. Smail, "Revolution in Bandung: 1945-1946" (Ph.D. Thesis, 
Cornell University, 1963), p. 17.
3. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in 
Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. Tl3- 
122, et passim.
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demobilization keenly resented the allocation of places to the KNIL, 
receiving support in this from civilian politicians, who required 
repeated assurances that the TNI--the revolutionary army--would 
remain the heart of the military.It Aside from this very powerful 
pressure, the army leaders had reasons of their own for doubting the 
usefulness of the former KNIL members. The Dutch had not insisted for 
nothing on KNIL inclusion in the Indonesian army and on the establish­
ment of a Netherlands Military Mission;4 5 and the Indonesian military 
leaders, however Westernized they might appear against the mass of 
the army, were strong nationalists who had no desire to accommodate 
what might well turn out to be a Trojan horse.
Even if the KNIL soldiers did not directly serve Dutch interests, 
there was no guarantee they would faithfully serve their erstwhile 
enemies; they might follow a rebel from among their own former chiefs-- 
as they did in the Westerling Affair of 1950--or become involved in 
movements of regional dissent--as they did in the same year with the 
Ambonese rebellion in South Maluku. Moreover, if KNIL members were 
allowed to rise through the officer corps by a promotional system 
which recognized competence alone, it could be expected that they 
would come to form a faction of some coherence and power, and this 
might well be a source of great trouble later for the existing military 
leadership. Finally, the revolution had given a strong corporate sense 
to the army, a memory of shared danger and of mission. To dilute this 
by granting significant roles to those who had opposed the Republic 
would both reduce the army leaders' own revolutionary claims to 
pre-eminence and damage the organic sense of unity of the military 
as a whole.
Consequently, no attempt was made by the army heads to preserve-- 
much less promote--former KNIL members who had not taken the Republic's 
side in the revolution, and most of them were retired or worked into 
insignificant positions early in the post-revolutionary period. Those 
who had joined the Republic's forces during the revolution suffered 
no great disability, and indeed one of them, A. H. Nasution, became 
army chief of staff. But there were very few in this dual position, 
and they were too sensitive about the "colonialist" element in their 
past to make Dutch military experience the basis of factional associa­
tion. The Westernized group of military leaders was composed for 
the most part of relatively well-educated civilians who entered into 
military activity under the Japanese or during the revolution and 
were brought together by their shared elite background, skills and
4. This formed a major theme in the parliamentary debate on army policy 
in September and October 1952; for the Defense Minister's major 
statement of assurance on the subject, see his reply to parliament 
of October 1, 1952, in Keng Po, October 2, 1952.
5. By the terms of the Round Table Conference agreement which ended 
the war with the Dutch, the Indonesians accepted a 600-man 
Netherlands Military Mission and received into their army all 
Indonesian KNIL members who wanted to enlist. See Feith, Decline, 
p. 15. The Mission, after heavy nationalist attack, was 
repatriated early in 1953.
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command of Dutch and not by colonial army experience.
The refusal to give a permanent place to KNIL elements meant that 
the Indonesian army lacked a colonially derived conservative element.
It also lacked a radical one. The shearing-off of those elements in 
the army which were identified with the Left came about largely as a 
result of the struggle for control of the armed forces by civilian 
governments during the revolution, a battle which ended by strengthen­
ing army claims to independence from civilian control and thus making 
less likely intra-army schism on the question of subordination to 
civil authority. Already in the Peta, future army leaders had been 
persuaded by their Japanese mentors of the need for military inde­
pendence from civilian control. When independence was proclaimed in 
1945, the Republican leaders acquiesced in the Japanese authorities' 
decision .to disband the Peta--which subsequently reformed, largely 
on its own leaders' initiative. This hasty disarmament, together 
with later concessions to the Dutch by the civilian governments, 
strengthened the military's conviction that the country's salvation 
could not rest with the politicians.
The Republic's political leaders, on the other hand, were anxious 
to assert civilian control over the armed forces, in whose independence 
they spied the seeds of fascism.6 Particular efforts were directed 
to this end by the Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin cabinets (1945-1947), which 
introduced a political commissar system into the army7 and gave 
preference to officers and units that appeared, for one reason or 
another, more sympathetic to the government than to the high command. 
Lasjkar, or irregular forces, were organized by the government and 
the parties (as well as arising of themselves), not only to further 
the struggle against the Dutch but also to serve as an armed counter­
weight to the recalcitrant army high command. They competed with the 
regular army for scarce weapons and supplies, were a source of sup­
port for local social revolutions, and were more inclined than regular 
troops to violate the various cease-fire arrangements negotiated with 
the Dutch. It was only natural that army commanders should find them 
a thorn in the flesh, and feel their own enthusiasm for revolutionary 
struggle increasingly qualified by a concern to prevent the triumph 
of disorder as embodied in the irregular forces. Even the govern­
ment was of two minds about the lasjkar, for it too was eager to 
minimize internal social upheaval and to give the Dutch no excuse to
6. For a discussion of the attitude of military and civilian leaders 
toward each other's roles at this time, see Anderson, "The Pemuda 
Revolution," pp. 355-363. The major statement of civilian fears 
of militarism was Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir's Perdjuangan Kita 
(Our Struggle), a pamphlet issued in November 1945^ Sutan Sjahrir,
Our Struggle,trans. by Benedict Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell Modern 
Indonesia Project, 1968), especially pp. 36-37.
7. This was primarily instituted through the Political Education 
Staff (Staf PePolit) created by the first Sjahrir government in 
1946 to indoctrinate and control the army. In addition, the 
Struggle Bureau (Biro Perdjuangan) of the Ministry of Defense, 
which was in charge of coordinating guerrilla activities, formed 
a center of civilian influence on military affairs. Government 
leaders referred to the Red Army (Soviet Union) as the inspiration 
for the system of political officers, asmmuch to secure army acknowl­
edgment that such a system was consonant with military success as much 
to indicate a desire to move the army more generally in a leftist 
direction.
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attack. The army commanders pressed for control and, where possible, 
the disbanding of the lasjkar, and in the several "rationalizations" 
of the revolutionary armed forces some of them were absorbed into 
the regular service (from which most of their members were demobil­
ized soon after the revolution) and others were dissolved.8
The reduction of the lasjkar and other instruments of civilian 
leverage gained speed with the installation of the Hatta cabinet 
in 1948, which sought to undo the work of the leftists who had 
previously controlled the Ministry of Defense. An alliance was 
struck between the army leaders and the new conservative regime 
whereby, in return for military support for the government's program, 
the army was freed of civilian interference, and both irregular forces 
and army units of dubious loyalty to the central command were dis­
mantled in the name of retrenchment and rationalization. The 
ensuing armed confrontation between Right and Left in the Madiun 
Affair of September 1948, in which Communists and troops allied with 
them appeared as rebels against a government already sorely pressed 
by the Dutch, gave the army leaders an excellent argument to use 
whenever, in subsequent years, political leaders again tried to 
engineer devices for the civilian control of their forces.9 The army
8. Of the many politically affiliated lasjkar, the most important were 
the leftist Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth) and the religious 
Hizbullah. The main officially sponsored lasjkar organization was 
the Lasjkar Rakjat Djawa dan Madura (Java and Madura People's 
Lasjkar). That the army's relationship to it was tense from the 
outset can be seen from the army's December 1945 statement that
it hoped to clear up the existing misunderstanding between its own 
organization and the lasjkar, but that it must be accepted that 
the army was the Republic's official fighting force and that the 
Lasjkar Rakjat was to unite the populace for defense. Unfortunately, 
the statement continued, the Lasjkar Rakjat had not been organizing 
youth into large, manageable, and effective groupings but had 
allowed them to form small partisan outfits of their own. Merdeka, 
December 14, 1945.
The Lasjkar Rakjat of Java and Madura showed a very different 
character from one district to the next depending on whether it 
was primarily in pemuda hands or under the control of local 
civilian government authorities. For a description of one of the 
"tame" ones, see Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press'^  1962) , p. 168. It was shakily 
united by a central executive, chairman of which was Ir. Sakirman, 
then a Socialist and later a prominent Communist leader; his office 
gave him the title of Major General and a place in the army's execu­
tive. The ambivalence of government authorities--civilian as well 
as military, and Left as well as Right--can be seen in the mild 
goals set out for lasjkar members: 1) to fight illiteracy; 2) to
improve military preparedness and catch spies; 3) to further cooper­
ation among the people, especially within peasants' and workers' 
organizations. Soeara Lasjkar, 1, No. 5, (March 1, 1947), p. 3, 
citing the results of the first Lasjkar Rakjat conference.
9. The demand for a political officer system became a serious issue 
in 1965, when it formed the opening shot in a Communist campaign 
to reduce the power of the military leadership. Whether it was 
seriously intended then is open to argument--given the army's 
longstanding view of its revolutionary experience of the institution
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leaders also endeavored to insulate their men against leftist sym­
pathies by stressing the treasonous character and disastrous con­
sequences of the Communist betrayal of the Republic at Madiun. In 
this they were largely successful with the officer corps, which, at 
least until the mid-1960’s, remained free of apparent leftist sym­
pathies; they fared less well, however, with the common soldiery, a 
third of which appears to have indicated a preference for the Commun­
ist Party in the 1955 general elections.10
Religious influence in the army was also reduced by the close 
of the revolution. In 1944, the Hizbullah was set up as an Islamic 
paramilitary group independent of the Peta. The actual amount of 
organization and training accomplished under the Japanese was minimal, 
but what was important was the fact that the Hizbullah’s foundation 
established the principle of separate Muslim military organization.
In effect, youth from the pious Muslim (santvi) community was 
channelled separately into the revolution. The Hizbullah became a 
lasjkar acting in league with the Islamic parties, and it thus 
entered on the anti-army side into the rivalry between the regular 
and irregular forces.11 In 1947, when the regular army abandoned 
West Java in accordance with agreements negotiated with the Dutch, 
Hizbullah elements in the area stayed on to carry out a guerrilla 
war and to nurse their grievances at what they felt to be the army’s 
abandonment of freedom and Islam. In August 1949, the Hizbullah
as a cause of friction and subversion in its ranks, the party 
could not have expected anything but the fierce objections which 
its proposal got. It is perhaps more likely that it was intended 
as a gambit to secure army acquiescence in a project it saw as 
more immediately realizable, that of securing a new armed service 
composed of militia (the "Fifth Force").
10. Communist Party (PKI) chairman D. N. Aidit claimed this publicly on 
several occasions, and as it was never denied by the army it seems 
probable it was so. Military men voted separately in the 1955 
elections, presumably because the army leaders were interested in 
discovering the political leanings of their men; the results of
the poll were never officially made public. One should be cautious 
in estimating the extent to which the Communist Party could hope 
to make use of this sympathy. Lower-class Javanese of abangan 
(syncretic Muslim) religious persuasion often felt the party was 
the one appropriate to their group--that is, they looked to it as 
a communal representative rather than a revolutionary force, and 
were not willing to go along with it in any challenge to authority. 
Also, the soldiers who looked to the PKI generally looked even more 
to Sukarno, and would not support any Communist actions which he 
opposed. The fact that following the 1965 coup the army leader­
ship was able to portray the party as having betrayed the President 
was probably a major reason why there was little army indiscipline 
in the campaign to liquidate the Communists.
11. For accounts of the establishment of the Hizbullah, see Harry J. 
Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague: van Hoeve,
1958) ; and Gatot Mangkupraja, "The Peta." The army specifically 
declared that it considered the Hizbullah on the same footing as 
the Lasjkar Rakjat and other armed civilian groups (Merdeka, 
December 14, 1945).
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leader S. M. Kartosuwirjo proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia, 
setting off a chain of religious revolt which was to last thirteen 
years. Some individual units and soldiers of strong religious con­
victions defected to his cause at the outset; others simply made no 
effort to remain in the post-revolutionary army.12 Later, orthodox 
Muslim youths who might otherwise have contemplated a military 
career either joined local Islamic guerrillas or chose civilian 
pursuits in preference to fighting champions of their own faith.
There was nothing in a military career as such that was repugnant 
to the pious,adherents of Islam, but the fact that so much of the 
army's post-revolutionary activity consisted of combatting Muslim 
guerrillas offered a strain on loyalties which few proposed to bear. 
Moreover, the long years of warfare against Muslim rebellion encouraged 
a tradition of army distrust of militant Islam, and the many Javanese 
officers of abangan persuasion were strengthened in their objection 
to Muslim aggressiveness. As a result of all this, the secularizing 
tendency common to the modern professional military was, in the 
Indonesian case, particularly marked; the santri officer became a 
rare bird, and, even when the army later entered into alliance with 
the Muslim forces in the anti-Communist campaigns surrounding the 
1965 coup, it showed a notable concern to prevent its Islamic collabora­
tors from acquiring any real access to power.
Loyalties to ideological elements outside the military were thus 
relatively weak, a factor which was probably of considerable importance 
in preserving the post-revolutionary army's coherence. There was, 
however, a major internal ideological challenge to the high command, 
and this was contained in the profoundly anti-hierarchical impulse 
of the revolutionary experience itself. If the Indonesian revolution
12. The Darul Islam revolt seems to have had its greatest impact on 
West and Central Java. It affected the military most deeply in 
West and Central Java. West Java was the heart of the revolt, 
and much of the Siliwangi Division's energies were employed fight­
ing it. In Central Java, insecurity connected with the Darul 
Islam revolt existed in hill areas along the West Java-Central 
Java border, in Banjumas and the coastal region around Pekalongan- 
Tegal, which was not declared militarily secure until the early 
1960's. Diponegoro battalions were also seconded to the Siliwangi 
Division to assist its operations against the main Darul Islam 
forces. Given the proximity of the insurgency, it was relatively 
easy for sympathizers in Diponegoro to join the guerrillas; the 
most famous defection was that of Battalion 426, which mutinied 
at the beginning of the 1950's.
In East Java there was no serious post-revolutionary insurgency 
in spite of the considerable religious tensions that had been 
exhibited in the Madiun Affair of 1948. Reflecting this calm, 
orthodox Muslim soldiers seem to have found a career in the 
Brawidjaja Division less of a problem than their co-believers in 
the Diponegoro and Siliwangi, and that force retained a number of 
santri officers. Brawidjaja Division troops participated only 
marginally in operations against the Darul Islam in Java; their 
expeditionary force in Sulawesi confronted the Kahar Muzakkar 
revolt, which also claimed a religious basis, but that rebellion 
presented itself at the military level very much as a matter of 
regionalism and the dissatisfaction of demobilized revolutionary 
partisans rather than as an Islamic affair. I am grateful to 
Lance Castles for drawing my attention to the greater representa­
tion of santri officers in the Brawidjaja Division.
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did not bring about the overthrow of the indigenous social order, it 
did have strong social revolutionary overtones, and those who partici­
pated most actively in it were deeply influenced by its mood. The 
training provided by the Peta also worked, psychologically, in this 
direction. The Peta's Japanese trainers conveyed an image of the 
martial role which appealed to a strong Indonesian tradition, one which 
was particularly vivid to young men in a time of war. The style was 
bravura, romantic and mystic, emphasizing that victory was to be had 
not by calculation but by the iron exercise of will, and that the 
essential soldierly ingredient was the possession not of formal skills 
or material equipment but of a flaming spirit.
This image fitted the Indonesian idea of the bravo, or do ago, 
who in times of disorder or oppression may appear as a popular 
champiop. More broadly, it spoke to the socially undigested group 
of young unmarried men usually referred to as pemuda. It- contrasted 
sharply, in turn, with the image of rationalism, order and expertise 
employed by the Dutch as the legitimizing style of their colonial role. 
It also was opposed to the style of the traditional elites of Java-- 
the prigaji and the Sundanese equivalent menak--which emphasized the 
qualities of refinement, harmony and impartial judgment; to this ex­
tent, it hinted at social revolution and was unacceptable to those in 
military and civilian command in the early 1950's. Equally important, 
it opened the possibility for penetration by civilian elements, who 
might urge the prior claims of the revolution and its leaders above 
the principle of the chain of command which the central army author­
ities were at pains to develop.13
The revolutionary experience might have been expected to produce 
a military leader of sufficient personal reputation to establish 
charismatic claims to dominance over the officer corps. It did
13. This discussion of the pemuda spirit and the Japanese and Dutch 
styles is drawn largely from Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The 
Pemuda Revolution," Chapter 1, e_t passim, and Benedict R. O'G. 
Anderson, "Japan:'The Light of Asia,"' in Josef Silverstein (ed.), 
Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays (New Haven: Yale 
University Southeast Asia Studies, 1966) . An interesting illus­
tration of pemuda attitudes can be found in the description of 
former revolutionary soldiers transmigrated by the government to 
South Sumatra, in H. J. Heeren, Het Land aan de Overkant: 
Transmigratie van Java naar Sumatra (Meppel: J. A. Boom en Zoon, 
1967). Heeren noted in the early 1950's that, "Another important 
characteristic of the [transmigrated ex-soldiers] was their strong 
dependence on the leaders of the various organizations. The 
leaders were deeply respected and blindly followed." At the same, 
the men also displayed a marked "cowboy spirit" (dgiwa keboi) , 
manifesting itself in the assumption of striking clothes and 
mannerisms and a general devil-may-care attitude (p. 82). The 
strong dependence on personal leadership--which was initially pro­
vided by men who had led them in the revolution--also meant that, 
in the long run, the leaders were held completely responsible when 
things failed to go right. They would be accused of corruption; 
all or part of their following would seek a new, presumably purer 
leader, in a continuing process of fragmentation (p. 87). In this 
we can see some of the aspects of the degeneration of revolutionary 
ties into more manipulative and fragile "bapakist” relationships, 
which will be discussed below.
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indeed bring forth a commander of such stature in General Sudirman; 
but he died at the close of the revolution, and the remaining high 
officers were sufficiently equal, when combat reputation, managerial 
expertise, ethnic background and popularity were all taken into 
account, for no one to shine as the obvious head. The rough equality 
of the army leaders' ages and of their claims to pre-eminence was to 
form a continuing source of strife, for it meant that a large body 
of people--the greater part of the revolutionary officer corps-- 
could feel entitled to high position in the peacetime army, and 
certainly to preference over those who entered after the vital period 
of the revolution. If they found themselves neglected by the center 
in the process of developing the post-revolutionary hierarchical 
pyramid, they were more than likely to feel justified in intriguing 
against their superiors; and, given the weakness of central army 
authority at the time, they were frequently able to make their claims 
stick. Indeed, it was only with the expansion of the army into non­
military activities, which proceeded from the takeover of Dutch 
property and the development of army roles in civil administration 
and mass organization in the late 1950's, that the high command 
would find a way to dispose peaceably of these unwanted but importunate 
colleagues, by placing them in lucrative or prestigious offices which 
were outside the mainstream of military promotion.
The very diversity of the revolutionary experience also provided 
an anti-hierarchical impulse. There was in reality very little 
central control over the military forces during the war for independ­
ence . The revolutionaries in the Outer Islands had minimal contact 
with Java, and they had not. had the same experience under the Japanese- 
even the essential element of the Peta was missing.11* Where there 14
14. The 16th Army, headquartered in Djakarta, sponsored the formation 
of Peta battalions on Java and Bali. Sumatra was occupied by 
the 25th Army, which also ruled Malaya; its headquarters were 
in Singapore, which was also the Southern Region Armies' Head­
quarters. Kalimantan and East Indonesia came under the jurisdic­
tion of Naval Civil Government Headquarters in Makassar. There 
was very little communication between these segments during the 
occupation, and the occupying forces pursued quite different 
policies with regard to relations with the local population, 
partly because of varying attitudes of the Japanese commanders 
and partly because they faced quite different susceptibilities 
of the populations to mobilization. For a discussion of the 
contrasting styles of the Japanese administrations, see Mitsuo 
Nakamura, "General Imamura and the Early Period of the Japanese 
Occupation," Indonesia, No. 10 (October 1970), pp. 11-19.
In Sumatra, a paramilitary organization was established under 
the Japanese equivalent name Bui-giyugun, but it was less extensive 
and in general had less impact than the Peta itself. It did, 
however, provide some of the leadership for the Republican forces 
in Sumatra during the revolution. The navy command provided no 
paramilitary training in Kalimantan and East Indonesia; revolu­
tionary forces there either sprang up as local partisan groups, 
without any training, or were led by Republican army men infil­
trated from Java during the course of the revolution. The 
extreme weakness of nationalist military strength in East Indonesia 
was one reason why, during the 1950's, a special expeditionary 
force from the Brawidjaja (East Java) Division was assigned to 
the area. Its relations with the regular territorial command 
were notoriously difficult.
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was an armed struggle against the returning Dutch, it drew its impulse 
and its recruits on the basis of local social pressures and alignments, 
and these did not correspond faithfully to the forces at work on Java. 
When, in the early post-revolutionary years, officers of Outer Island 
provenance who had experienced the revolution on Java were placed in 
charge of former guerrilla forces in their home area as part of the 
effort to bring them into line with the center, they faced a difficult 
task; and, in the end, they often found it easier and more profitable 
to cultivate local allies against a high command which could back its 
centralizing, ambitions neither with adequate patronage nor with effec­
tive force. Similarly, officers sent from Java to areas where there 
had been no effective Republican strength found themselves and the 
men who came with them painfully isolated expeditionary units, if they 
were not of local origin; and if they were, they soon changed from 
representatives of centralism and nationalism to the protectors of 
local interests against Djakarta's demands.
Even in Java, the revolutionary experience provided little basis 
for a commonly acknowledged military hierarchy. In the ever-narrowing 
territory of the Republic, units operated in virtual independence of 
each other, or in an association with neighboring forces that was 
more collegial than hierarchical. Furthermore, the units were local­
ly raised and thus reflected the ethnic and cultural complexities of 
Indonesia's central island. This meant that the strongest ties pro­
vided by the revolutionary experience were narrow but intense, and 
they formed the basis for cliques and alliances which endured long 
after the revolution. Indeed, army politics of the post-revolutionary 
period can scarcely be understood without reference to the associa­
tions of this time. Those in charge of the army after the revolution 
were faced with the task of weakening these non-hierarchical ties and 
preventing any one group of old associates from obtaining dominance 
in any important command or service which it might well make into a 
vehicle for resistance to central claims and advancement of its own 
interests. In accomplishing this, the army leaders could lean on 
their own revolutionary associates only at the peril of arousing 
suspicion of favoritism and a desire to close the top positions to 
outsiders; it was thus no easy assignment, and for some time the 
army chiefs made little headway with it.
Not only the high command, but also officers in command posi­
tions at lesser levels, needed more than their formal authority to 
ensure the execution of their orders. During the revolution, a com­
bat officer's effectiveness and reputation had rested largely on his 
ability to attract and keep a following of soldiers; these commonly 
had no military background but had been drawn into the struggle by 
idealism, a desire for adventure, and the conviction that service 
under a strong and protective leader offered the greatest security 
available in a war-torn world. Under these conditions, a commander's 
authority depended not so much on his formal office as on the strength 
of his personality and his ability to appear as a father figure to 
his subordinates.
This close personal relationship between officers and men also 
characterized the style demonstrated by the Japanese in the Peta, 
and it fitted as well with older Indonesian traditions of the relation­
ship prevailing between a superior (bapak: literally, father) and
his following (anak buah, offspring). The intensity of the experi­
ence of young men in the revolution meant that the bapak-anak buah 
relationships established then were much more vivid and enduring
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than were any subsequent ties between commanders and their men. The 
counter-insurgency and Irian campaigns also provided a special bond 
for those who took part, but they in no way matched the revolution 
as a luminous personal experience. Later, when torn between revolu­
tionary loyalties and the authority of their current commander, 
soldiers were only too likely to choose for their revolutionary chief 
or to avoid action altogether.
In the same way, relationships established during the revolution 
between officers serving in the same area or under the same commander 
were much closer and more enduring as factional sources than the 
associations they entered on later; this tended to give a qualitatively 
different character to the responses of officers who had experienced 
the revolution and those who came later, and caused the former to 
judge their associates on the basis of their revolutionary participation, 
to the exclusion and annoyance of the growing number of post-revolu­
tionary officers who did not share their experience. The criterion 
of being "present"--having been an active participant and on the 
right side--was also applied to other points of crisis in the army's 
history in determining an officer's standing, but never to the ex­
tent this was done for the period of the revolution.
The First Centralizing Attempt and 
the October 17 Affair
In the initial post-revolutionary years, a prominent role in the 
Indonesian government was played by what Feith has called the 
"administrator" group of politicians, whose brief pre-eminence rested 
on their superior managerial knowledge, the general desire for 
stability following the chaos of the revolution, the temporary 
eclipse of Sukarno and the post-Madiun dispersal of the Left, and 
the confusion of nationalist revolutionaries regarding post­
independence goals. Archetypically, this style was represented by 
the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), a small cadre party whose 
leaders had strong ties to prominent members of the military high 
command. During the Wilopo government, which came into power in 
April 1952, the chief of staff of the armed forces, Major General T. B. 
Simatupang, was the brother-in-law of the secretary general of the 
Ministry of Defense, Ali Budiardjo; both of them were supporters of 
the PSI. The Minister of Defense, Hamengku Buwono IX, Sultan of 
Jogjakarta, was the man army leaders had preferred since the outset 
of the revolution for that post, and though officially non-partisan 
he also had close informal ties to the PSI. General Simatupang,
Army Chief of Staff Colonel A. H. Nasution, and West Java (Siliwangi 
Division) commander Colonel Alex Kawilarang had been closely asso­
ciated since their participation in the KNIL officer traning class 
of 1940.15 In this congenial environment, the army command pursued 
its plans for a post-revolutionary military rationalization which 
would greatly strengthen discipline and central control. At the
15. Henri J. H. Alers, Om een Rode of Groene Merdeka (Eindhoven:
De Pelgrim, 1956), pp. 285-286. Alers also notes that the wife 
of PSI chairman Sjahrir was from the court of the Jogjakarta 
Sultanate, and that the secretary general of the Ministry of 
Defense, Ali Budiardjo, soon thereafter married her sister.
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same time, it asserted its claims to freedom from unsympathetic 
civilian control, particularly in the sticky matter of finance and 
control over the placement of military personnel.16 It is possible 
that the mutual appreciation between the army leaders and the civilians 
most closely involved with them blinded them to the overall weakness 
of their position, for neither the army leadership nor the politicians 
friendly to them were in firm control of the institutions currently 
under their command. They soon over-reached themselves, with disas­
trous results for the central military chiefs.
The contest which proved the undoing of the army high command 
pitted it, on the one side, against soldiers who feared demobiliza­
tion and regional commanders who sought to establish their autonomy, 
and, on the other, against civilian politicians who objected to the 
PSI or wljo were concerned to insure military subjection to civilian 
decision making. Either one of these was a powerful opponent; to­
gether, they reinforced each other so well that the military leaders 
were soon faced with a situation which, it seemed, only desperate 
methods could solve. They attempted to take such measures with the 
coup de force of October 17, 1952; and its failure spelled their 
downfall. I should like to take up some aspects of this affair, 
for its course illustrates broader problems in the struggle for 
control of the army.
16. One of the principal issues was the matter of the propriety of 
ship purchases arranged by the General Staff and the Ministry of 
defense; it was charged that the arrangements were made through 
a PSI concern and that a high price was paid, presumably to pro­
vide rake-offs. Opponents of the army leadership and the PSI 
argued that there should be greater parliamentary control over 
military spending. At the same time, they asserted that military 
autonomy in placement policy was leading to a dangerous concentra­
tion of power in the hands of Nasution and his allies. Zainul 
Baharuddin, secretary of the Defense Section of parliament, charged 
that "Only those who are of the same opinion as the KSAD [Army 
Chief of Staff] are allowed around him. And, as much as possible, 
in the divisional units they are trying to gather only those who 
are in agreement with the army leadership. In working for this 
goal, methods are used by the secretary general of the Defense 
Ministry with which we are all too familiar." Parliamentary 
speech of October 3, 1952, in Disekitar Peristiwa 17 Oktober 1952 
(Djakarta: Republic of Indonesia, Ministry of Information, mimeo, 
1953), p. 124. Zainul Baharuddin was the principal spokesman for 
parliamentary opposition to the military leadership. He was a non- 
party man, but was a relative and friend of Lieutenant Colonel 
Zulkifli Lubis, then head of the armed forces' intelligence agency 
(Feith, Decline, p. 253); we shall hear more of Lubis later. Out­
lining the methods by which he claimed the army and Defense Ministry 
leadership were working towards elimination of unreliable officers, 
Zainul Baharuddin declared that they were called to serve in 
Djakarta, were sent to attend courses or other further training, 
or were assigned temporarily to duty with units other than their 
own and then [when they had been sufficiently separated from 
their original clientele and source of support] they were retired.
If they entered a protest against this, they were sent through a 
maze of official procedures until they gave up. Zainul Baharuddin 
gave as examples of persecuted officers whose position was uncer­
tain: Col. Sungkono, Col. Hidajat, Col. Djatikusumo, Major Nazir,
Major Bedjo and Lt. Col. Abimanju. (Ibid.)
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The issue that brought matters to a head was the high command's 
dismissal of Colonel Bambang Supeno, one of the most senior army 
officers and the formulator of the official military code of princi­
ples, Sapta Marga. He had incurred the wrath of the high command by 
declaring his reservations concerning its plan for transforming the 
army into a small, highly equipped and mobile "cadre army."17 Even­
tually, after heated exchanges with the military chiefs, he publicly 
declared his lack of confidence in them and was thereupon suspended 
from duty.
The army, Bambang Supeno maintained, should concentrate on peo­
ple rather than equipment, remaining a mass force which possessed 
close ties to its civilian surroundings and was oriented toward 
local defense. In his argument, he summoned the populist slogans 
of the "revolution, but sentiment was not the only basis for his 
stand, and we should be careful not to identify, in this or later 
conflicts, the argument on rationalization as necessarily being one 
for and against rationality. Bambang Supeno stressed that for 
Indonesia manpower was cheap and locally produced, while heavy equip­
ment would cost a great deal in scarce foreign exchange and require 
skills and servicing which the country was by no means equipped to 
provide. That the proponents of a cadre army, for their part, were 
not unmoved by romantic considerations is evident from their monument­
building assertions (in the light of the national budget) that they 
sought to provide Indonesia with an armed force of internationally 
recognized excellence--not to mention their eventual acquisition of 
a great deal of impressive, expensive and unnecessary materiel. To 
the opponents of a highly equipped army, this course promised debt 
and dependence on foreign powers, just as it seemed to the more 
Westernized army leaders with their emphasis on expertise, technologi­
cal advancement and discipline, to be the natural choice. Romance 
and reality mingled in both arguments, and this is perhaps why they 
were presented with such heat.
It is also necessary to bear in mind that the contrast between 
these two appeals reflected not only ideological leanings but also 
the power position of their advocates. An officer's relation to 
the center of power had a good deal to do with his inclination to 
stress expertise and discipline as against people-mindedness and
17. The Ministry of Defense announced soon after the formation of the 
Wilopo cabinet that the army would reorganize itself as a 
kernleger--cadre army--and in the process would reduce its numbers 
from 200,000 to 100,000 men. The main problem, as the army saw 
it at that point, would be to find a livelihood for the half of 
its membership it was returning to civilian life. Statement of 
Major Bahtar Lubis, spokesman for the Ministry, Harian Rakjat, 
April 23, 1952. For a detailed presentation of the problem by 
Nasution, see A. H. Nasution, Tjatatan-Tjatatan sekitar Politik 
Militer Indonesia (Djakarta: Peinbimbing, 1955) , pp. 262- 295.
In his quarrel with the army leadership, Bambang Supeno ap­
proached Sukarno, to whom he was distantly related, and sub­
sequently collected officers' signatures in various military 
territories for a petition to oust Nasution. Feith, Decline, 
p. 250. This seems to have been the earliest instance of an 
appeal to the President by a subordinate to remove his commanding 
officer.
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revolutionary reputation. The "professional" approach, with its 
emphasis on hierarchy, discipline and order, automatically favored 
those at the top, and there was a natural tendency for those in the 
army high command to emphasize it. Officers who assumed the opposing, 
"revolutionary" style might do so for any one of several reasons: 
because they were personally attuned to the bravado manner and had 
few professional qualifications; or because they were of radical 
intellectual persuasion; or--and this was quite frequent--because in 
the struggle for power within the army they found themselves opposed 
to their superiors and hence to the claims of professional discipline. 
They might not persevere in this position if their power interests 
changed; and, in fact, if we look at the principal officers involved 
in the disputes over rationalization and central control in the 1950's, 
we find this was often the case.18 It was natural for an officer who 
was in t;he central command, or who saw his fortunes linked to it or 
its members, to see the virtues of professionalization, hierarchy, and 
discipline; and it was equally natural for one who felt his interest 
threatened by those in power in Djakarta to praise the revolutionary 
spirit and to accompany this with the cultivation of sympathy among 
military anak buah and local civilians. This tendency was a per­
sistent one, even in the post-1965 period, when hitherto conservative 
officers who found themselves at odds with the central command were 
commonly accused of "Sukarnoist" tendencies and themselves in turn 
assumed positions to the left of those they previously were wont to 
hold.
The fact that many officers changed their ideological arguments 
to suit their power interests does not mean that they assumed their 
stands quite cynically. They had experienced both the revolution 
and life in a professional army, and for them the two styles reflected 
incompatible but very real ideological worlds. The preservation of 
both sets of values in army thinking meant that neither had unques­
tioned legitimacy for the military, and thus they tended to remain 
factional weapons rather than universally assumed elements of the 
military creed.
To return, however, to the events surrounding the crisis of 
October 1952. The culmination of the argument over Bambang Supeno's 
dismissal was a demand by parliament that the army leadership be 
reconstituted and, in particular, that Ali Budiardjo, Nasution and 
Simatupang be dismissed. From the viewpoint of the high command, 
this was the kind of civilian interference which the military could 
not brook if it were to preserve the autonomy essential to its role 
as guardian of national independence. As it became evident that 
parliament was approaching this unpalatable conclusion, the army 
heads held a series of meetings at which they sought to secure the 
backing of other officers for a counter-move. These included some 
officers with whom they had had close revolutionary associations and 
who might be expected to support their demands, others who were 
prominent by reason of their office or revolutionary reputation, and 
regional commanders.
18. This will, I hope, become clear in comparing the alliances in 
the October 17 Affair with those of the Lubis Affair four 
years later, as discussed below.
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These last, the -panglima, headed the seven territorial units 
into which the post-revolutionary Indonesian army was divided.19 
Because of Indonesia's geography and the weakness of central con­
trol, these regional commanders had great independence vis-a-vis 
Djakarta, and the army leadership's relationship to them was more 
one of negotiation than of command. The territorial commanders looked 
on themselves as the equals of the officers on the general staff, and 
they considered that decisions of basic policy should be taken col- 
legially, with them, rather than by the central authorities alone.
As we shall-see, the high command was later to devote no little 
thought to reducing the power of the panglima; and the fact that 
panglima conferences continue to play a major part in the legitima­
tion if not the origination of army policy testifies to the enduring 
importance of regional power.
The results of the deliberations between the senior officers 
became apparent on the morning of October 17, 1952, when thousands 
of people--brought in, as it turned out, by army trucks--appeared 
before the presidential palace bearing placards that proclaimed a 
popular demand for the dissolution of parliament. To prevent this 
appeal from falling on deaf ears, heavy guns were dispersed around 
the palace, and a little later a delegation of army leaders arrived 
to present Sukarno with its endorsement of the people's voice.20
19. The seven military territories were: I, North Sumatra (head­
quarters at Medan); II, South Sumatra (headquarters at Palembang); 
III, West Java (Bandung); IV, Central Java and Jogjakarta 
(Semarang); V, East Java (Surabaja); VI, Kalimantan (Bandjarmasin); 
VII, East Indonesia (Makasar). This last division included 
Sulawesi, Maluku, and Bali and the Lesser Sunda islands.
20. According to Feith (Decline, p. 264), whose account of the affair 
is generally sympathetic to the army leadership, the show of armed 
force at the time of the arrests of parliamentary leaders that 
took place on October 17 was not the plan of Simatupang and 
Nasution, but the act of a smaller group of General Staff officers 
in cooperation with Lieutenant Colonel Taswin, the Djakarta city 
commander--militants corresponding to what we would now call
"New Order radical" officers. This is not at all impossible, for, 
both in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods, we find 
subordinates undertaking more radical action than their superiors 
intended, either because they feared that their commanders would 
negotiate if given the opportunity or because they saw an oppor­
tunity to gain fame for themselves. At the same time, however, 
officers frequently found it politic to feign reluctance while 
quietly encouraging impatience on their subordinates' part, the 
better to present their demands as the result of overwhelming 
pressure from below and to escape full responsibility if the move 
failed. It seems likely this was Nasution's purpose in the con­
frontation with Sukarno at the palace on October 17: the chief
spokesman for the officers' group was Lieutenant Colonel Sutoko, 
with regional commanders Colonel Simbolon and Colonel Kawilarang 
making supporting statements; Nasution's own formal role was 
only to introduce the speakers. (Pedoman, December 6, 1952, 
reporting a press statement by Nasution issued by the Information 
Bureau of the Army General Staff, in response to an unfavorable 
account of his role by the Information Bureau of the Armed Forces 
General Staff. For a detailed account of the October 17 Affair,
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From the army leaders' viewpoint, they were paying parliament 
back in its own coin, and it is possible they would have settled for 
a compromise whereby an unreconstructed assembly would stay out of 
what an unreconstructed army staff considered to be its own territory. 
In any event, it seems clear the military chiefs did not intend their 
move as a bid for direct army rule, but sought, maximally, an arrange­
ment whereby Sukarno would serve as the leader and legitimator of a 
regime which would provide a much enhanced role for the army. The 
army chief of staff, Colonel A. H. Nasution, had evidently been con­
templating a"coup to this effect for some months.21 He was eventual­
ly to achieve a version of his goal with the establishment of Guided 
Democracy, but in 1952 luck was not with him. The president, who had 
been heartened by his ability to sway the crowd before the palace 
gates, temporized with the army delegation's demands, promising sat­
isfaction to all sides, and the military leaders made the fatal mis­
take of taking him at his word. Later that day, he broadcast an 
appeal for popular calm which implied his strong disapproval of 
attempts to rock the ship of state, and thereafter he and the politi­
cal parties set about working the destruction of the high command.
They did this in the first place by appealing to the symbols of 
the revolution, claiming loyalty to the president as its particular 
test. Officers who had attempted to force their will upon Sukarno 
and the nation had, it was implied, no legitimate right to their posts, 
and patriotic subordinates who wished to take action against them 
would receive not only approbation but, perhaps, the newly vacant 
offices. These hints were conveyed broadly by implication and 
specifically by pro-government officers sent out from Djakarta, who 
were influential in the army units to which they repaired. These 
missions were accompanied by demostrations of parties and mass 
organizations in key cities, which strengthened the appearance of 
government power and helped to provide a steamroller effect for the 
removal of rebellious officers. Very shortly, intra-military coups 
began to take place, in the course of which commanders who had 
favored the army leadership were removed from their posts; elsewhere, 
officers were able to maintain their commands only after confronta­
tions with their subordinates in which they were forced to assure them 
that they would not act without their approval.22
including the debate that preceded it, see the government com­
pilation Disekitar Peristiwa 17 Oktober 1952. The annual chronology 
of events, Tempo dan Peristiwa, also published by the Ministry 
of Information, is valuable for a synchronic presentation of the 
elements leading up to the affair and its denouement.
21. Feith, Decline, p. 262. According to this account, Nasution 
planned to use the Siliwangi Division, headed by his then ally 
Colonel Alex Kawilarang, to accomplish this. Both the Sultan 
and Major General Simatupang opposed the plan, but, according to 
Feith, Nasution did not give it up until he found it impossible 
to secure Sukarno's agreement to the arrests of military and 
civilian opponents that Nasution wished to carry out.
22. The major coups of panglima were in East Java, East Indonesia and 
South Sumatra. The first and most important was East Java, where 
the pro-October 17 stand of the Brawidjaja Division's acting com­
mander, Lieutenant Colonel Suwondho, was shaky because he had 
only recently assumed the position following the illness of
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The army high command proved quite helpless in confronting this 
pressure. It had lost the initiative after accepting Sukarno's 
assurances that morning at the palace, and the kind of backing that 
it had received from the senior officers' meetings was too narrow and
Colonel Bambang Sugeng. He therefore did not have a strong per­
sonal grip on the division; he might be thought by other officers 
to have committed it on the basis of insufficient authority; and 
might not be able to prevent the intervention of the regular 
commander, who was not so very ill. At the same time, younger 
officers in the Brawidjaja Division were demanding a reshuffle 
of the general staff and regional commanders that would put 
their Bambang Sugeng in the post of army chief of staff and 
make the senior regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel 
Sudirman, the new East Java panglima. See Disekitar Peristiwa 
17 Oktober. p. 482, for the reorganization they reportedly pro- 
posed. The Brawidjaja Division's defection would break the 
solid panglima support for the October 17 action, which it was 
critically necessary to retain. Therefore two of Nasution's 
closest general staff associates, Lieutenant Colonels Suprapto 
and S. Parman, went to East Java, taking with them Sudirman, 
who had been in Djakarta at the time of the affair. They 
arrived in Surabaja, on the evening of October 21, to find that 
earlier that day Suwondho, pressed by Bambang Sugeng's return 
and the arrival of senior pro-government divisional officers from 
Djakarta, had chosen to take a defiant stand and to declare he 
would be responsible only to his regimental and city commanders 
(Disekitar Peristiwa 17 Oktober, p. 429, quoting Suwondho's state- 
ment as reported by P. I. Aneta, October 22, 1952). By the time 
the general staff delegation had arrived, Suwondho was under 
arrest by pro-government colleagues, and his replacement by 
Sudirman was announed the next day. Sudirman trimmed his sails 
to a generally pro-Sukarno line, but his position remained suf­
ficiently ambivalent and critical that negotiations with both 
sides continued, culminating by November in pilgrimages first by 
Sukarno and then by the Sultan and Nasution to East Java to secure 
him for their side (see Merdeka, November 12, 1952, for Sudirman's 
statement following the visit of the Sultan, in which he made 
clear his decision for Sukarno).
A few days after Sudirman's final rejection of the October 17 
proponents, the commander of East Indonesia, Colonel Gatot Subroto, 
was ousted by his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Warouw, who 
announced that he would refuse to see Nasution or the Sultan un­
less they were authorized by Sukarno. Gatot Subroto, he charged, 
had told his fellow officers he would accept orders only from 
Vice-President Hatta or the Sultan (Disekitar Peristiwa 17 
Oktober, pp. 439-450, text of Warouw's statement on assuming 
command") . As Warouw was a local man--unlike Gatot Subroto, who was 
Javanese--and as he was sufficiently senior, the government con­
firmed him in the post he had seized. On November 23, Lieutenant 
Colonel Kosasih, the acting panglima of South Sumatra, was the 
victim of a coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Kretarto, commander of 
Brigade X, who charged that he had not acceded to his subordin­
ate's demands that he take a strong stand against the October 17 
Affair. Kretarto was not confirmed in his new position, however, 
the government appointing the retired Colonel Bambang Utojo to 
head the territory instead. (Sumber, November 20, 1952, in 
Disekitar Peristiwa 17 Oktober, pp. 445-447.) There was also
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conditional for it to contemplate any drastic attempt to restore its 
position. When the government considered its position well secured, 
it undertook the removal of those it held most responsible. These 
were Ali Budiardjo and General Simatupang, of whom parliament had 
earlier proposed to rid itself, and also the army chie,f of staff, 
Colonel A. H. Nasution, and his closest associates on the army gen­
eral staff.* 23 24 Moreover, Simatupang's former office of armed forces 
chief of staff was dissolved, the better to prevent army domination 
of the services and to allow the civilians to promote inter-service 
rivalry as an instrument of their control. The post of acting army 
chief of staff was given to Colonel Bambang Sugeng, who found himself 
helpless in the face of army factionalism and government hostility.21* 
The army now entered a period of maximum decentralization and expo­
sure to civilian influence, the low point of its post-revolutionary 
estate.
The whole episode was a nightmare to the army leaders, who saw 
their ambitions destroyed at a blow; and as Nasution and his closest 
associates were not to remain out of power for long, their reaction 
was of some importance. The experience bore in upon them the essen­
tial frailty of a central command which, possessing no strike force 
of its own, was able to impose its will on outlying commands only 
by means of persuasion, intrigue and appeals to the scarcely sacred 
principle of military discipline. More important, perhaps, it pointed 
out the danger of taking on civilian leaders --particularly Sukarno-- 
when these were in a position to call on the symbols of the revolu­
tion and to garner support from officers hostile to the central com­
mand. Nasution appears to have come to the conclusion that a frontal 
move against the president would be foolhardy and that the army's 
cause was best served by pursuing its goals in such a way as to avoid 
a direct challenge. At any rate, he did not subsequently attempt to 
face down the president when, as happened increasingly in the Guided 
Democracy of the 1960's, Sukarno took a position that was far from 
the army's liking.
trouble in the Central Java division. Diponegoro regimental com­
manders pressed the panglima, Lieutenant Colonel Bahrun, to state 
his position on the October 17 Affair, and, at a meeting on 
November 22, he finally assured them of his support for the govern­
ment position on the coup. (Abadi, November 27, 1952). He re­
mained in command, but his authority was much weakened.
23. Many of these changes occurred, however, not under the Wilopo 
government but after the July 1953 accession of the first Ali 
Sastroamidjojo cabinet, which was strongly opposed to the military 
policies of its predecessor. Rather as "the army" tends to be 
presented as a monolithic and anonymous actor in accounts of 
civilian politics, "the government" has tended to be so in this 
one. For the play of civilian forces involved in this and other 
affairs recounted here, see Feith's study of the period.
24. It seems not unlikely the appointment of Bambang Sugeng was related 
to promises made by the government in order to secure Brawidjaja 
support in the critical post-coup weeks. Moreover, Bambang 
Sugeng's illness at the time of the affair left him conveniently 
with no strong record on it, so that he could be viewed as a 
compromise candidate.
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The president himself was usually cautious in testing Nasution's 
complaisance, and only towards the end of his rule, encouraged by 
growing intra-military disunity and a sense that time was running 
out, did he begin to move in a way that again threatened the coher­
ence of the army high command. When he did so, he was to employ 
the same levers for breaking hierarchical discipline that were 
utilized by the government forces at the time of the October 17 
Affair, namely the appeal to nationalist and revolutionary principles 
against senior officers who had purportedly betrayed them. As in 
1952, this was a powerful weapon, for not only did it appeal directly 
to patriotic emotion, but it provided legitimation for attempts by 
subordinates to replace their superiors--and as the channels of 
military promotion had become increasingly clogged this was an 
attraction which had gained in savour with the years.
The revolutionary appeal was not used solely by Sukarno and the 
civilians. In general, in the post-1952 period, regional commanders 
who wished to solicit the support of their troops in defiance of 
central pressures found it profitable to hark back to the days of 
the revolution and to accuse the high command of having strayed from 
the ideals of those times onto the paths of corruption. Their use 
of revolutionary slogans naturally lent a radical cast to their 
arguments; that this did not necessarily reflect actual leftist 
leanings is evident from the fact that the recalcitrant regional 
commanders of the mid-1950's, who used these slogans, were generally 
allied to civilian forces of the Right. Moreover, as the appeal to 
common soldiers' loyalty was possible for troop commanders more than 
for those in administrative posts, use of the slogans became involved 
in the tension between the line and staff officers, which increased 
as inflation made outside sources of income more necessary to an 
officer's livelihood and caused combat officers, with limited access 
to official perquisites and to unofficial opportunities for deals 
with civilians, to resent those in staff posts whom they felt to be 
taking unfair advantage of their position. Their extreme response 
was to call on the principles of the revolution and to denounce the 
worldliness and hypocrisy of the bureaucrats on the staff--again 
without necessarily being themselves political radicals.
These were not the only occasions for the use of the revolutionary 
appeal, nor was it a weapon that served only against the high command. 
During the late 1950's, faced with grave central weakness and regional 
unrest, the army high command made wide use of the theme of loyalty 
to the revolution and Sukarno in order to secure the support of sub­
ordinate officers against powerful and rebellious officers outside 
Java. Given the regional commanders' own use of revolutionary slogans, 
the center's stress on loyalty to Sukarno and the revolution was an 
attempt to trump the local card of patriotic memory with a national 
one. We can thus see that when, in October 1965,the coup forces of 
Lieutenant Colonel Untung appealed for the support of "progressive­
revolutionary" officers against a corrupted army general staff--and 
soon thereafter General Suharto urged loyalty to the army leadership 
in the name of the revolution and Sukarno--the two sides, subordinates 
and superiors, were playing a game with which both were quite familiar. 
By and large, however, the army high command adopted the "revolutionary" 
approach only when in extremis, for from its viewpoint an appeal to 
non-hierarchical values was generally more dangerous than useful. It 
consequently sought to minimize its use and to develop other means of 
dealing with recalcitrant subordinates, and, under the New Order, 
after Sukarno himself had been declared beyond the pale, revolutionary
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slogans were virtually discarded by the army high command.
After Nasution's fall in 1952, real power in the army passed out 
of the hands of the central command and into those of the panglima, 
and, indeed, of lesser territorial officers. The weakness of the 
center not only allowed more power to be exercised at lower levels, 
but it aided the consolidation of power there. It did so in two ways. 
In the first place, the inability of the army leadership to impose 
its will meant that it could not take steps to transfer officers who 
were striking local roots in a way that appeared dangerous to the 
interests of the high command. In the first post-revolutionary years, 
the Simatupang-Nasution leadership had been able to take advantage of 
the general sense of flux, the extension of Republican authority to 
vast new territories, and the fact that their rivals had not yet 
coalesced against them, to effect sweeping troop transfers and changes 
of officer assignment. These were aimed at breaking the ties with 
the local environment formed by the Indonesian fighting forces dur­
ing the revolution, in the interest of maximizing central control.25
The reaction to the October 17 Affair undid much of this effort, 
for in some places "foreign" commanders were replaced by officers of 
local derivation, and a stronger voice was given to the lesser ranks, 
who more often were local men. Those who held territorial command in 
the post-October 17 period were much more dependent on the support of 
their men and had much less to hope and fear from the central command. 
They attempted to make permanent the positive aspects of this situa­
tion by cultivating their subordinates and the local civilians in the 
hope of securing their support against future demands by Djakarta. 
When, after 1955, a restored Nasution attempted to reassert central 
control, he found himself confronted with well-entrenched regional 
opposition who could be removed by only the most delicate negotia­
tions or by force of arms.
Secondly, the weakness of the army center meant that it was un­
able to press the military's claims effectively upon the government, 
particularly in the matter of the budget. The army's income dropped 
catastrophically after 1952,26 with the result that the high command 
lost that important source of patronage and discipline, and regional 
commanders began to make deals with local business interests which 
enabled them to support their troops and preserve the loyalties of
25. See Feith, Decline, pp. 248 and 252.
26. Nasution made this a major element in his bid for internal army 
support for his return to power. Thus, in his Armed Forces Day 
speech of 1956, he noted that whereas, in 1951-1952, the army had 
consumed about half a billion rupiah in foreign exchange, in 1954- 
1955, it had not spent more than five million and the purchase of 
foreign equipment had virtually ceased. In 1952, Rp. 200 million 
was spent on new buildings, in 1955 only one-fifth of that amount. 
Forgetting for the moment his earlier promotion of rationaliza­
tion, he pointed out that, in 1950-1951, the army had still 
recruited soldiers and trained new officers, but since then there 
had been no renewal of personnel. Text of the speech, in Putera 
Sum Samudera, No. 10 (October 1956), p. 12. For a more detailed 
survey by Nasution, see Tjatatan, pp. 232-261.
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their subordinates. This gave them a financial base independent of 
the center, one which sometimes was so strong that even if the 
military budget had been restored the commanders would have lost 
income by giving up their local arrangements. Moreover, it helped to 
identify military officers with the interests of the civilian elites 
at the regional and local levels. We have already remarked that 
officers tended to come from the more privileged parts of society.
At the same time, they generally were not of the same social status 
as civilian officials on the level at which they operated; they had 
been imbued'with the ideas of revolution and progress; and they saw 
the army as an instrument of general social improvement. But with 
the post-revolutionary emphasis on retrenchment and expertise, with 
the general sense of let-down and confusion that followed the end of 
the independence struggle, and with the establishment of business and 
later marriage ties to the privileged elements of local civilian 
society, both the initial reforming elan and the actual amount of 
social mobility in the army decreased, and it began to assume the 
characteristics of a conservative force. More than this, the 
military's local financial dealings not only served to keep troops 
well-fed and loyal but padded the pockets of the commander and those 
who assisted him in his dealings. The fact that many of the most 
lucrative arrangements involved smuggling from the export-producing 
border areas only increased the tendency of military men to draw the 
conclusion that soldiers need not take the law too seriously nor pro­
vide a particular example of honesty. There thus began, at quite an 
early stage, the process of personal corruption and entanglement with 
civilian concerns that has plagued the military ever since.
The post-October 17 period also saw a rapid deterioration of 
the revolutionary bonds between troop commanders and their anak buah 
into a much more instrumental patron-client relationship. This was 
part of the universal degeneration of revolutionary elan, and it 
rested as well on the fact that rationalization and transfers 
separated many men from the officers they had served under in the 
revolutionary years, and that their ties with their subsequent com­
manders did not attain the same emotional level. It sometimes hap­
pened, of course, that anak buah remained in contact with their former 
chief, and, particularly if he served nearby or if his followers had 
meanwhile achieved posts of importance, he could still use them in 
confronting his own superiors. Over time, an extremely complex system 
of alliances and possible alliances was developed on the basis of 
patron-client relationships that existed between commanders and their 
(former) subordinates, and in periods of uncertainty and maximum 
decentralization such as the mid-1950's, when a commander's strength 
rested as much on his subordinates' support as on his official 
authority, the cultivation of these ties became a central preoccupa­
tion for the holders of office. The panglima sought to secure the 
personal loyalty of the regimental and city commanders below them, 
and these in turn tried to insure their authority and prepare their 
future advancement by soliciting the support of the battalion commanders 
and men in their service.27
27. Of some interest in this connection is the matter of the army's age. 
Nasution declared (Tjatatan, p. 203) that, in 19 54, the average 
age of soldiers was 34 years. This seems extraordinarily high, 
for it would mean that the average soldier would have been 27 
years old at the outbreak of the revolution. Possibly the figure 
is sharply affected by the absorption of former KNIL members into 
the post-revolutionary army; but, by 1954, the great number of
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All this went to make up the phenomenon of "bapakism," which was 
a particular object of concern for the army high command in the 1950’s,28 
and which, in one form or another, was continually to interfere with 
the principle of the authority of the chain of command. An officer 
whose men were strongly loyal to him was obviously in a much better 
position to act independently than one who had only the general 
claims of army discipline behind him; it was therefore in his superi­
ors' interest to reduce this independence by emphasizing professional 
discipline and/or their own personal claims for loyalty. In severe 
cases of recalcitrance it behooved the center to dislodge the offender, 
if it could, by transferring him from his power base, preferably to 
an administrative post, to a politically insignificant territory, or 
to a command whose ethnic composition was such that he would find it 
hard to create a strong personal bond with his men. Conversely, it 
was in the interest of the officer concerned to cultivate bapak-anak 
buah loyalties among those beneath him, to seek a command which would 
both maximize the number of his personal supporters (including, in 
the case of territorial commanders, civilians who might back him for 
ethnic, political or economic reasons), and best of all to obtain 
a command which would be strategically situated in terms of negotia­
tions with the capital. Above all, an officer of ambition had to 
resist any attempts to remove him from such a post once won, unless 
he could exact a heavy price in terms of promotion or patronage.
Many of the most dramatic moments in the history of Indonesian military 
politics have hinged on maneuvers to secure the transfer of a powerful 
commander, though often enough, after the mid-1950's, the only public 
indications of the struggle were the lengthy postponement of command 
transfers which had been officially announced.
All things being equal, it has consistently been in the interest 
of an officer to cultivate personal loyalties to himself among those 
below him, while discouraging any similar propensity on his junior 
officers' part. Hence we may well find the same officer acting as a 
bapak in one situation and as a stickler for professional values in 
another. But some officers have been less able than others to capi­
talize on the bapak-anak buah relationship, either because they have 
generally held staff rather than command posts, because they have 
never headed units for long or under combat, or because they do not 
personally arouse the enthusiasm of their men--and these we naturally 
find supporting professional values alone.
these had been retired or otherwise left service, and one would 
have expected the older ones to have been among the first to be 
mustered out. One possibility is that younger soldiers, tending 
to be of lesser rank and education, were early victims of the 
post-revolutionary rationalization program; or that they were 
more optimistic about possibilities for a non-army career and so 
left once the revolution was over. In any event, the army seems 
to have been left by the mid-1950's with a corps roughly the same 
age from private to chief of staff, and of sufficiently advanced 
years that an extra-military career would be hard to come by.
That this made for extreme frustration and status tension goes 
without saying.
28. For an early discourse by Nasution on the subject, see "Garis 
Rentjana Pendidikan Tentara," Tjatatan, pp. 328-331 (statement 
issued in April 1951).
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Reflecting the dispersal of authority and the importance of 
"bapakist" relationships following the October 17 Affair was the 
fact that the instrument for determining army policy in the period 
between 1952 and 1955 was not meetings of the general staff nor yet 
panglima conferences, but rather the officers' union, IPRI.29 The 
congress of this organization had taken place immediately after the 
revolution, in January 1950, and its second had been called at the 
end of the same year to deal with the serious intra-military dis­
agreements over changes of command and structure resulting from 
Indonesia's<transformation from a federal to a unitary state. The 
third meeting took place in 1952 in the wake of the October 17 Affair 
and was devoted to stabilizing the turbulent internal army situation 
that those events had produced.30 Smaller conclaves of officers were 
also held in the name of conferences of the IPRI, while regional and 
local committees provided forums for the consolidation of junior 
officers' opinion on the larger affairs of the military.
The IPRI was something of a trade union and something of a 
representative assembly. It had arisen from the egalitarian and 
democratic impulses of the revolution, drawing for its tradition 
on the frequent revolutionary practices of electing commanders and 
making collective decisions on important action. One reason it had 
been created was to preserve solidarity within the broader "family" 
of those who had served in the officer corps, and so it included 
veterans and made no distinction between those on active and non­
active duty.
These characteristics provided two, rather contradictory, reasons 
for the association's prominence in the 1952-1955 period. For one 
thing, the loss of central control and discipline which followed the 
October 17 Affair, and the very intense emotions and factionalism 
to which the affair gave rise, placed great emphasis on the opinion 
of regimental- level commanders and of middle rank officers whose 
revolutionary reputation or other personal characteristics made them 
influential outside the chain of command. At the same time, the 
fact that the IPRI did not exclude non-active officers meant that 
those who had been removed from their posts as a result of the 
October 17 Affair could continue to have a voice in army policy­
making if it was carried on under IPRI auspices. Nasution and his 
colleagues made full use of this, and as the army's position grew 
more difficult in relation to an unsympathetic government, opinion 
within the IPRI began to swing around in favor of the authors of 
October 17.
During 1954, as the leaderless army's authority and income con­
tinued their post-1952 decline, sentiment within the various officers' 
gatherings began to shift from a concern with negotiating factional
29. Ikatan Perwira Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Republic Officers' 
League. There was also a non-commissioned officers' union, the 
IBRI, Ikatan Bintara Republik Indonesia.
30. Pikiran Rakjat, August 6, 1955, contains an account of the early 
history of the IPRI. Reflecting the dominance of the Java 
divisions and the balance of power between them, the first of 
these gatherings was held in Jogjakarta, the second in Bandung, 
and the third in Tretes, outside Surabaja.
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differences to the desire to achieve a more positive form of unity.
A special Collegial Meeting called in February 1955 in Jogjakarta 
established standing committees which were to handle controversial 
issues involving military personnel; it also drew up the "Jogja Charter," 
a statement of army policy designed to end the worst of the factional 
quarrelling, and it resolved to press basic army demands on the 
government. 1 In the last task, the IPRI failed, and, in August 1955, 
it held a congress again, this time to discuss the events that had 
flowed from the resignation of Colonel Bambang Sugeng, who had given 
up his post as acting army chief of staff in despair at the govern­
ment's indifference to the Jogja Charter demands. The main purpose 
of the meeting was to present a united front regarding acceptable 
successors to Bambang Sugeng's post, and to prevent the government 
from again trying--as it had immediately following Bambang Sugeng's 
withdrawal--to impose on the army a leader that was not of its 
liking.3 2
The meeting of February 1955, which produced the Jogja Charter, 
was already under the considerable influence of the October 17 group, 
and meetings held later to discuss Bambang Sugeng's successor indi­
cated strongly that the weight of opinion lay with those on the 
October 17 side. Much of this appears to have been a reaction to the 
Ali Sastroamidjojo government and its defense minister, Iwa 
Kusumasumantri, whose determined rejection of the October 17 propon­
ents made them temporarily into symbols of army independence in their 
colleagues' eyes. By the time of the IPRI congress of August 1955, 
the group's strength was such that the meeting's chief speakers were 
Nasution, Simatupang and Vice-President Hatta--the last having emerged 
as a civilian legitimator favored by the October 17 group following 
Sukarno's ruination of their hopes.31 23 Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, who
31. For the Collegial Meeting (Raco, Rapat Colegial), see Darius 
Marpaung (ed.) , Almanak Angkatan Perang 1956 (Djakarta: Upeni,
1956), pp. 58-611 and Feith, Decline, pp. 3TT7-398. About 270 
officers attended it.
32. The government tried to appoint the South Sumatra commander,
Colonel Bambang Utojo, and the resulting army boycott brought 
about the fall of the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet. See Feith,
Decline, pp. 399-409. According to Feith, and to Pauker ("The 
Role of the Military in Indonesia," p. 311), army officers contem­
plated a coup at this point, but decided to wait in the hopes that 
the general elections scheduled for a few months hence would re­
sult in a realignment of power more congenial to their interests.
The Working Committee of senior officers established by the 
Collegial Meeting as its main standing committee, was headed by 
Colonel Simbolon, who as the most senior active officer had reason 
to urge that considerations of hierarchy be observed in granting 
the post; he was able to obtain the committee's support for a 
declaration implying as much. Soon thereafter a meeting of panglima 
urged that the appointment be made according to seniority--which, 
so long as the possibility of restoring non-active officers was 
not considered, meant supporting Simbolon for the job. In consider­
ing Simbolon's role in the ensuing Lubis Affair, this should be 
kept in mind.
33. Pikiran Rakjat, August 6, 1955.
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had been an opponent of October 17 and who now, as deputy chief of 
staff, was the army's highest (though not most senior) officer, was 
not allowed to give a major address, the main statement of leadership 
policy being made by Nasution, who outlined the way in which he hoped 
to deal with the problems of army disunity and of regional and 
religious rebellions.3 *
Nasution was in fact reinstated as chief of staff the following 
October, and thereafter the IPRI's fortunes declined. For the first 
year of his -command, his position was so weak that the union's influ­
ence was unaffected, but--as had been the case when the October 17 
group was out of power--its sympathies tended to swing to those who 
were not in command. At the end of 1956, when Nasution had just put 
down a coup that posed the gravest threat to his control, the IPRI 
intervened to rescue Lubis, his defeated rival,34 5 a gesture the 
victorious chief of staff found difficult to forgive. In the 
regional crisis the following year, the union's branches were at 
times useful to the central command's efforts at unseating recal­
citrant territorial commanders, since they provided a forum for 
subordinate officers who, with Djakarta's encouragement, could rally 
local resentments of the defiant commander and remind their col­
leagues of the need for national unity and loyalty to Sukarno. But 
thereafter, when such extreme central weakness did not exist, the 
IPRI was of dubious value to the army high command. It gave too 
great influence to the opinion of middle level officers, and it 
stressed shared revolutionary experience and patron-client relation­
ships rather than current position in the army hierarchy. Since it 
included non-active officers, it gave a forum to individuals whom 
the army leadership had taken pains to remove from circulation; 
moreover, it represented veterans, who as a group were a notorious 
source of discontent and anti-hierarchical opinion. Therefore, once 
Nasution's weak initial position had been overcome,he worked to re­
place the IPRI with other associations directed increasingly away 
from policy--a task which was not difficult in view of the fact that, 
during 1957, the regionalist crisis reached such proportions that 
the IPRI was unable to function effectively as a central forum, 
while, after the defeat of the regional rebellion, Nasution's personal 
authority in the military was great enough to overcome collegial 
demands. The final version of the IPRI-style association was Tjandra 
Kirana, an organization devoted to the welfare of military families, 
whose officials were automatically those of the regular command.
The Lubis Coup and the Restoration 
of Central Authority
The reinstatement of Nasution as chief of staff in 1955 had not 
gone without objection from prestigious officers who fancied themselves
34. Pikiran Rakjat, August 8, 1955. Zulkifli Lubis gave a short 
address in which he said he regretted not being able to present 
the major speech because the task of speaking in the name of the 
chief of staff had been assigned to others.
35. See below, the IPRI intervention of November-December 1956.
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for the post and from territorial commanders who wished central author­
ity to remain weak. But the other potential candidates were even 
more opposed to each other than to Nasution, and they may also have 
reckoned at first that his position would be so precarious that they 
could look forward to his speedy downfall. The government, however, 
had come to see that it must have a strong army head if Djakarta's 
authority was to be preserved, and Nasution was able to have his way 
in the vital matter of placing personnel.36
It has heen argued that, in his years of forced retirement, 
Nasution underwent a change of heart regarding his relations with 
Sukarno and the Nationalist Party, and that, therefore, he supported 
their attitudes towards regionalism rather than those of the Masjumi 
and PSI, parties to which he had earlier seemed sympathetic.37 It 
seems likely, however, that civilian ideological alignments were not 
for him the main consideration. Nasution was concerned first of all 
with military politics; he was a strong centralist who sought to 
preserve the unity of the nation (and to enhance his own power) by 
strengthening the army chain of command and imposing Djakarta's will 
on the outlying regions. His concern for order and control had 
pitted him against what he saw as parliament's disorder and inter­
ference in 1952. He was indeed philosophically more sympathetic to 
the Masjumi and PSI than to Sukarno and the Nationalists, but, by 
1955, the interests of the Masjumi and PSI had become identified 
with those of decentralization and regional unrest. Within the 
military Nasution's strong centralizing ambitions were more immedi­
ately appreciated, and officers tended to line up for and against 
him--and thus for and against the government in power--to the extent 
they saw their interests threatened by a strong, Nasution-led high 
command. This affected, in the first place, his rivals for office, 
and, in the second place, territorial commanders whose power would be 
broken by separation from their command. Some of these had been for 
and some against him in 1952; the rivalries which arose out of 
Nasution's reappointment in 1955 did not follow any discernable pat­
tern of ideology, style, or previous factionalism, but coalesced 
above all around the officers' perceptions of their relationship to 
central military power.
Of all those officers who saw their interests threatened by 
Nasution's resumption of leadership, surely the most distressed was
36. Nasution returned to office under the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet 
(August 1955-March 1956). According to the army, the cabinet had 
accepted a plan for a massive reshuffle of personnel which Nasution 
had presented in February 1956. Feith, Decline, p. 501, citing a 
statement by the deputy head of the army information office, in 
Abadi, July 11, 1956. It seems likely that the Masjumi-led Harahap 
government had been proceeding on the assumption, common to civil­
ian politicians at the time, that the newly reinstated chief of 
staff would be friendly to Masjumi/PSI interests and that their 
position would be improved by giving Nasution a strong hand. Under 
the succeeding Nationalist-led cabinet, the Defense portfolio was 
concurrently held by the prime minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, who 
obtained Nasution's cooperation, with the agreement that the chief 
of staff would have a free hand in army affairs. Feith, Decline, 
p. 502.
37. See, for example, Feith, Decline, pp. 443-444.
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Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, who made no secret of his resentment when 
handing over the central command to his rival. But, for the first 
half year of his office Nasution moved very quietly, gradually imple­
menting a series of low-level changes designed to remove key supporters 
of those territorial commanders whom he wished eventually to transfer; 
and his opponents were not sufficiently alarmed to bury their dif­
ferences. Towards the middle of 1956, the pace of these reassignments 
increased sharply, and it became evident that, unless something was 
done, the central command would soon be very powerful indeed. Those 
who thought .they would lose by its aggrandizement now became greatly 
concerned, and their nervousness was communicated as a rising sense 
of insecurity in the officer corps. At last, Zulkifli Lubis had the 
necessary support to undertake a reversal of the situation, and, in 
August 1956,he invited some of his fellow officers to contemplate a 
coup. I should like to outline in some detail Lubis' effort, which 
spanned the next three months, because it illustrates some of the 
general propositions concerning army behavior which I have been dis­
cussing and also because it led directly to the military involvement 
in the regionalist movements of 1957. The open, protracted character 
of Lubis' attempt has not been otherwise characteristic of coups in 
Djakarta, but its equivalent can be seen often enough in the prolonged 
negotiations surrounding the coups against officers in the Outer 
Islands in the course of the regional disturbances.
There was, Lubis declared to the August 1956 gathering at his 
home in Djakarta, no need for the Indonesians' revolution to end 
in corruption, dissension and despair; they could emulate Egypt, 
where the military truly understood its role as national saviour.
Like the leaders of the October 17 Affair (whom he had strongly 
opposed at the time), Lubis did not call for the removal of Sukarno, 
but declared that the president could be forced to accept the dis­
solution of political parties and the establishment of a military 
junta.38 Lieutenant Colonel Abimanju, whom Nasution had recently 
replaced as second deputy on the general staff, illuminated Lubis' 
remarks by describing the progress of Egypt, which he had just 
visited; and the meeting ended by deciding the impending changes of 
territorial command must be prevented.39 40
It was already late in the day for Nasution's opponents to gather 
their forces. Key changes had taken place in regimental commands, 
and the planned shift of major panglima-ships was to take place in 
the next ten days. The most important of these were the commands of 
Territory III (West Java), headed by Colonel Alex Kawilarang, a 
proponent of October 17 and purportedly a key figure in Nasution's 
own coup plans of 1952;1*0 Territory VII (East Indonesia), which was
38. Sin Po, December 13, 1956, text of the statement by Prime Minister 
Ali Sastroamidjojo to the parliament giving the government's 
account of the Lubis Affair. This source is hereafter referred
t0 as Ali-DPR. It is not clear who, besides Abimanju, was among 
the senior officers attending Lubis' meeting. However, the 
account of Lubis' subsequent maneuverings should give a general 
picture of his military sources of support.
39. Ali-DPR; and see Merdeka, December 12, 1956.
40. See footnote 21 above.
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under Colonel J. F. Warouw, who had seized the post from his former 
commander in the October 17 Affair; and Territory I (North Sumatra), 
where Colonel M. Simbolon--who had been strongly pro-October 17 but 
was also one of the principal claimants for the office of chief of 
staff--was scheduled to be replaced by Lubis himself. The East 
Indonesia command was of great importance because it covered a major 
export area and was a center of open army involvement in smuggling; 
if the central government were to preserve its authority and the high 
command to establish its integrity, it was essential to bring the area 
under firmer'control. Warouw's position was powerful, for, as a local 
man, he had strong Sulawesi support, and the regimental commanders who 
ran the more distant parts of his far-flung territory as their own 
fiefs were likely, unless delicately handled, to take his side in any 
attempt to impose central discipline. Nasution therefore sought to 
minimize the visible degree of change by appointing another local man, 
Lieutenant Colonel H. V. Sumual, as Warouw's chief of staff and then 
moving him into command, thus arriving at a panglima who, if he turned 
out to be an opponent, would have less local prestige and fewer claims 
on a military following. As for Warouw, the possibility of his making 
further trouble was to be reduced by sending him on assignment abroad.1*1
In the Sumatran command, which posed the same problems of illegal 
exporting as Territory VII, the shift in panglima was designed to kill 
two birds with one stone. It would remove Colonel Simbolon from his 
home region and the command where he had built up a following; he 
would be brought to Djakarta, where he would have fewer effective 
connections and from which, Nasution may have further calculated, he 
could eventually be transferred safely abroad. Lubis, on the other 
hand, had had most of his career in Djakarta, and his support was 
strongest in the central offices of the army and in the West Java di­
vision. If he were removed to Sumatra, much of his power would 
probably be permanently lost, and in any case he would not present so 
immediate a threat as he did in the capital.1*2
Of all the seven territorial commands, the most vital to control 
was that of West Java, which contained both Bandung--the headquarters 
of most army corps and central training installations--and the national 
capital, whose defense was under its command.1*3 The territorial 4123
41. Warouw was to join the presidential delegation which embarked on a 
world tour in August 1956 and was thereafter to become military 
attache in Peking.
42. It was intended that Simbolon would replace Colonel Sukanda 
Bratamenggala as Inspector General of Instruction and Training, the 
headquarters of which were in Bandung. This would remove from a 
key post, and probably from Bandung as well, an officer who was 
strongly sympathetic to Zulkifli Lubis and who had considerable 
influence in the Siliwangi Division. See Sin Po, September 15, 
1956.
43. The Greater Djakarta city command (KMKB-DR) was formally of regi­
mental status within the main territorial division, as was the 
case with other principal city commands. In addition, it was the 
headquarters of Regiment 7 of the Siliwangi. After the Lubis 
Affair, when Nasution had secured a Siliwangi Division he could 
count on for support, the West Java division's control over the
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division, the Siliwangi, was originally Nasution's own; he retained 
considerable influence in it, and, when he was considering a coup 
of his own in 1952, this was the force on which it seems he hoped 
to base the move. But Kawilarang was a very popular commander and 
had been in charge for many years, and Lubis had his following there 
as well. The Siliwangi, moreover, was a grouping of great ideologi­
cal complexity, and there was room in it for movements based on 
Sundanese localism, on a sense of cosmopolitan superiority, on 
progressive.notions, on anti-Communism, and many permutations of 
these. These variegated moods were magnified by the unease of mid- 
1956, which was expressed in the frequent reunions of former pemuda 
and lasjkar groups, who asked where the revolution had gone and 
whether they must watch the country sink ever deeper into corruption. 
The impending changes of command, and the uncertainty as to what 
further transfers would take place, gave the sense of urgency and 
motion necessary to turn these generalized feelings of malaise into 
a readiness for action. It was to prevent his opponents from utilizing 
this state of mind that Nasution moved to replace Kawilarang by 
Lieutenant Colonel Suprajogi, who as a Siliwangi alumnus could hope 
for early acceptance and influence in the division but who as a man 
of the center (he had until then been quartermaster general) and a 
lesser personality was not likely to form a threat of his own. 
Kawilarang was slated to become military attache in Washington, a 
post that should effectively prevent the utilization of his popularity 
on behalf of either Lubis or himself. This transfer of divisional 
authority, the most urgent of all the three, was to take place on 
August 14, four days after the meeting in Lubis' house.
The method by which Lubis and his associates endeavored to fore­
stall Kawilarang's ouster was to engineer the arrest of the Foreign 
Minister and several other civilian notables on charges of corruption. 
This seems to have been partly a device to secure the postponement 
of the transfer ceremony (which was to take place the next day), 
partly a signal to more distant enemies of Nasution that there was 
a movement they could ally with, and partly to establish publicly 
the theme of their claim to power, the fight to restore honesty and 
a sense of high purpose to the state. The bid failed, for reasons 
which were typical of the behavior of Nasution and his opponents 
during the whole period of their struggle. In the first place, 
Nasution's enemies moved too late to be effective. Both Simbolon and 
Warouw sent in supporting demands, but they arrived only after the 
fateful transfer had taken place. Organization was poor: no agitation
capital command seemed advantageous, but civilian political leaders 
were anxious to force a separation in order to protect themselves 
from the possibility of a Siliwangi-general staff decision for a 
coup. In 1960, Sukarno was able to take advantage of Nasution's 
discomfiture,following the exposure of a smuggling scandal in 
Djakarta in which army leaders appeared to be involved, to secure 
the creation of separate divisional status for the capital region. 
Most of the new Djaya Division's troops were transferred from the 
Siliwangi, and they retained their identification enough to form 
a Siliwangi "alumni association" within their new division.
See Berita Yudha, August 9, 1965, formation of the Djakarta 
branch of the BPC Siliwangi. However, the civilians, and especial­
ly Sukarno, did their best, not unsuccessfully, to secure a 
pliable attitude on the part of the divisional leadership.
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was organized in the capital or in the Siliwangi Division itself at 
the time the arrests took place, so that the turbulence that might 
have forced a postponement was not achieved. Nasution himself dealt 
with the affair by a judicious combination of negotiation and pressure, 
taking advantage of the various participants' uncertainty of their 
status and of the limits to which they were actually willing to go.'*1' 
The upshot of the affair was that, by the end of the day, Kawilarang 
was forced to declare officially that he was handing the whole matter 
over to the chief of staff; and the next day he was replaced. A week 
later Warouw”s replacement was carried out, on schedule despite his 
complaints. More important, Zulkifli Lubis was replaced in his post 
of deputy chief of staff by a Nasution ally, Colonel Gatot Subroto.
Lubis' speech at the ceremony in which he handed over his office 
to Gatot Subroto had the sound of a man who has lost--he stressed the 
unpleasantness he had had to endure, the sacrifice of himself and his 
position, the denial of justice1*5--but he was in fact not yet quite 
willing to give up. He now turned, however, from the grand arena of 
panglima politics to the more easily available one of the Siliwangi 
Division. On September 9, he met with some of its officers in 
Tjipanas, a resort town halfway between Djakarta and Bandung. He 
called for their aid in overthrowing the government and establishing 
a Military Council that would supervise the workings of a new one.
His appeal was well received, and the officers returned to secure the 
support of their subordinates . **6
Almost immediately, word of the plot leaked out, and both Nasu­
tion and the division's new commander moved to minimize Siliwangi 
support for it. On September 26, after several tours of inspection 
and battalion roll-calls at which Suprajogi had sounded divisional 
opinion and explained the center's viewpoint, the new panglima man­
aged to get a meeting of Siliwangi regimental and city commanders 
formally to reject a coup as a means of improving the affairs of 
state. But three days later, Lubis met with Siliwangi officers who 
were still willing to go ahead with the affair, and they agreed on 456
44. What appears to have happened is that Kawilarang, as commander 
of West Java, ordered the Djakarta city commander, Major Djuhro, 
to arrest the civilians. Accordingly, three members of Djuhro's 
intelligence staff arrived at the house of Foreign Minister Ruslan 
Abdulgani early on the morning of August 13 with a summons. Ruslan's 
wife telephoned the prime minister to ask the meaning of all this, 
and he in turn called the secretary general of the Defense Minis­
try, who phoned Nasution, who in turn telephoned Djuhro. Djuhro
was evidently quite unprepared to confront pressure from so high 
a level; he ended by personally repairing to the Foreign Minis­
ter's house in order to summon back his three officers, who, them­
selves awed by the magnitude of their undertaking, had been 
patiently waiting on Ruslan's negotiations. Algemeen Indonesisch 
Dagblad, August 14 and 15 , 19 56; Merdeka, August 16", 1956; and 
Sin Po',' September 8 , 1956 (Suprajogi's account of the affair).
45. Sin Po, August 20,' 1956, summary of Lubis' speech.
46. Ali-DPR.
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the general outlines for a seizure of power. **7
The central command did not feel strong enough to bring matters 
to a head or even to interfere substantially in Lubis' activities, but 
it chipped away at his support, forcing the postponement of planned 
actions, encouraging the hesitant among his allies to believe that if 
they withdrew nothing would be held against them, and waiting for 
frustration to bring dissension and distrust. Each round of the 
game, Lubis.' support in the Siliwangi grew narrower, more impatient 
to act, and more ready to despair. The center had the advantage that 
its very weakness encouraged its opponents to remain in the open; the 
high command could keep track of Lubis even if it could not arrest 
him, and it could be fairly confident of the direction from which a 
coup move would come. Moreover, although Nasution and his associates 
had plenty of enemies elsewhere, they seem to have been transfixed by 
the maneuvers between Lubis and the Siliwangi; save for the announce­
ment by Abimanju, the Egyptian advocate of Lubis' first meeting, who 
had since become panglima of Territory VI (Kalimantan), that he would 
arrest any central government or army official who entered his ter­
ritory, Nasution's non-Siliwangi opponents took no action until Lubis' 
defeat was certain.1*8
As was common in Indonesia during periods of stress, rumors of 
an impending coup clustered around October 5, Armed Forces Day, when 
military leaders and large numbers of troops gathered in the capital. 
Whether because the Lubis group actually proposed action then or 
because Nasution wanted to take advantage of the spate of rumors to 
justify more drastic measures against his opponents, the chief of 
staff called, on October 4, for the investigation of army members 
suspected of political involvement, and he ordered the Siliwangi 478
47. Ali-DPR; Harian Rakjat, November 24, 1956; according to the latter 
account, the most active supporter of Lubis at the meeting was
Lt. Col. Kemal Idris, commander of Regiment 9 (Tjirebon).
Suprajogi's initial meetings with the Siliwangi officers must have 
presented an alarming state of discontent, for he went to see the 
prime minister with the urgent demand that corruption and in­
efficiency in the central government be controlled. Pikiran Rakjat, 
October 5, 1956, statement by the Siliwangi information officer.
Very likely, too, his ostentatious visit was designed to show his 
subordinates that he could represent Siliwangi interests at the 
highest level.
48. On November 15, Abimanju ordered Hassan Basrie, the commander of 
Regiment 21 (Bandjarmasin), to detain all field grade officers and 
ministers arriving from Djakarta and to arrest various officials 
in the Kalimantan capital. Basrie, a Kalimantan commander since 
revolutionary days, was little inclined to subordinate himself in 
such an extreme step to a newly arrived commander. He sought and 
obtained the support of his regiment against Abimanju and then 
solicited the backing of Regiments 20 (Pontianak) and 22 
(Balikpapan), whose commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Siahaan and 
Lieutenant Colonel Ibnu Subroto, had assumed a wait-and-see 
attitude following Abimanju's move. Harian Rakjat, November 21, 
1956. As a result, Abimanju was without power in his own division, 
a fact of critical importance in his surrender to Nasution 
described below.
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commander to discipline members of his division suspected of engaging 
in such affairs.99 He then summoned to Djakarta Colonel Sukanda 
Bratamenggala, inspector general of instruction and training, and 
Colonel Sapari, the adjutant general, two Bandung-stationed officers 
who were of influence both in the Siliwangi and in West Java society; 
he wished to discuss with them their patronage of the Sundanese 
Youth Front (Front Pemuda Sunda), which had been founded the previous 
June.
In part this was an excuse to take the two officers out of pro- 
Lubis action, but the central authorities also had reasons to be 
disturbed about the youth group as such, as was evidenced by Nasution's 
stress on the problem of "youth juntas" in his Armed Forces Day 
speech.49 50 51 Like many of the pemuda groups that became active about 
this time, the Sundanese Youth Front reflected the desire for radical 
change and the resurgence of the "primordial sentiment" of ethnic 
identity which had become marked as national government became seen 
as stagnant and corrupt. "Youth" was an elastic concept, and the 
groups included revolutionary veterans and former lasjkar members, so 
that it was very easy for their activity to resonate with local 
military unrest. The penetration of civilian ideas could have had 
very serious consequences for central efforts to channel intra­
military dissent, for as long as conflict in the army was primarily 
a struggle for personal advancement, irrevocable commitments were un­
likely to be made. Indonesian officers do not seem to have been suf­
ficiently convinced of the political potential of the military itself 
to see in an army takeover a cause worthy of unquestioning devotion, 
despite the talk of the Egyptian example and the ringing declarations 
of Salvationist intent; participation in intrigues and even coup 
maneuvers were nearly always taken with an eye out to withdrawal if 
the adventure seemed unpromising. It was thus far better, from the 
high command's viewpoint, that its military opponents not acquire an 
ideological cause; and as the Front Pemuda Sunda and its ilk offered 
some possibility for forming one, Nasution was eager to isolate the 
military from them.
The visit of Sukanda and Sapari in fact constituted the first 
stage of their arrest; but because of their influence and the high 
command's weakness, and because Nasution wished to convey the impres­
sion that he was the soul of moderation, the matter was handled with 
great politeness. They were guests, it was said; Sukanda stayed at 
Nasution's house and Sapari at Gatot Subroto's; they were moved back 
and forth between Bandung and Djakarta, remaining more or less (but 
increasingly less) free to see whom they pleased. Unfortunately for 
this diplomacy, word was leaked out that orders had actually been 
issued for the arrest not only of Sukanda but also of several 
Siliwangi officers sympathetic to Lubis; this caused a new flurry of 
excitement in the division, and those who felt themselves threatened 
decided they must move quickly for a coup. They sought to do so be­
fore Sukarno returned from his current trip abroad, for the president 
could only be expected to throw his weight against them given the 
the civilian alliances they had struck. 1
49. Sin Po, October 9, 1956; Ali-DPR.
50. Pikiran Rakjat, October 5, 1956 (text of the speech).
51. When word leaked out that arrest orders for Sukanda and Sapari 
had been issued, a press conference was arranged for them by the
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On the evening of October 15, Lieutenant Colonel Kemal Idris, 
commander of the Ninth Regiment (headquartered at Tjirebon) and one 
of the officers purportedly slated for arrest, appealed to his officers 
to provide troops for a coup in Djakarta on the grounds that they 
could thus prevent his incarceration by Nasution. He had already led 
them in an attempt on the 11th, when they and troops from Major 
Suwarto's Eleventh Regiment (Tasikmalaja) had headed towards Djakarta, 
expecting a friendly reception from the city commandant there, Major 
Djuhro, a Lubis ally; but they had not succeeded in squaring the com­
mander of the Eighth Regiment (Bogor), whose territory lay across their 
route. Confronted by guards from that regiment and not wishing to 
embroil themselves violently with a fellow Siliwangi unit, they had 
returned home.52 Now, however, Kemal Idris proposed that they go via 
Purwakarta, thus avoiding the center of the Eighth Regiment's domain.
He needed the troops for only three days, he declared, and he gave an
army leadership to explain that this was not so. Sukanda used the 
occasion to make points of his own which were typical of the hard- 
pressed dissident officer: He appealed to civil authority against
that of his army superior (by saying that a magistrate would have 
to examine the case before any arrest); he appealed to the fears 
of his colleagues (arguing that it should not be possible to 
arrest an officer without showing just cause); and he stressed the 
strength of his following (telling how subordinate o’fficers and 
non-coms had tried to "kidnap" him at the airfield because they 
feared for his safety in Djakarta, and how they continued to urge 
him to allow them to liberate him). Sin Po, October 11, 1956, 
reporting Sukanda's press conferences; also Sin Po, November 15, 
1956, citing a general staff source.
The putative arrestees were, in addition to the above-named, 
Lieutenant Colonel Taswin (who, we will remember,had been an 
enthusiastic proponent of the October 17 move in 1952); Major 
Djuhro, the Djakarta city commander; and Lieutenant Colonel 
Kemal Idris, commander of Regiment 9. The news was given to 
foreign journalists by Lieutenant Colonel Rudi Pirngadie, the 
official army general staff spokesman, and was published in the 
Straits Times on October 10. See also Merdeka, October 11, 1956. 
Both Pirngadie and Lieutenant Colonel Chandra Hassan, the head of 
army intelligence, were fired for this (Merdeka, October 17, 1956); 
the fact that they had evidently attempted to sabotage Nasution's 
maneuvers illustrates how weak the chief of staff's position 
was at the time, with many key central offices still not in the 
hands of men he could trust.
The decision to move for a coup before Sukarno's return-- 
scheduled for October 16--was discussed in a meeting in Colonel 
Sapari's house in Bandung and also in a gathering between Lubis 
and Siliwangi officers in Lembang (outside Bandung) on October 
12, according to the government's account. Ali-DPR.
52. Ali-DPR; Pedoman, October 17, 1956; Bintang Timur, November 23, 
1956. These accounts give the impression that the Regiment 8 
commander, Achmad Wiranatakusumah, was solidly opposed to Lubis' 
actions; but later there were charges that he had become involved 
in the movement, and Suprajogi, in discussing these, made the 
ambiguous statement that "as an individual" (setiara pribadi) 
Wiranatakusumah had not been involved. Merdeka, November 27,
1956.
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impressive list of the units whose support could be expected for a 
move to oust Nasution.53 54 In addition to army help, he added, they 
could reckon on the participation of the village defense organiza­
tion, OKB,5  ^ whose members would be armed and some of whom would 
participate in the attack on Djakarta.
This proposal to involve armed civilians in a military move was 
not rare in Indonesian coup attempts. The reason was seldom a purely 
military one; indeed, the ill-trained militia was usually likely to 
be more of a«hindrance than a help in the lightning seizure of power. 
However, army rebels, whether of the political Left or Right, usually 
called on The People for legitimation of their decisions to move, and 
participation by The People in one form or another was therefore con­
sidered psychologically important. Also, armed civilians could be 
risked in ways which army personnel could not. Most attempts to seize
53. The list of units Kemal Idris reportedly declared would back an 
anti-Nasution coup is interesting, though the extent of support 
was doubtless exaggerated. He said that Territory I (North 
Sumatra) would be thoroughly on their side, which was probably 
right; and that II (South Sumatra) was in favor except for its 
commanding officer (there were in fact reports of unrest in the 
division and an attempt to carry out a coup against the panglima, 
Colonel Ibnu Sutowo, about that time). Territory IV (Central 
Java, under Suharto), would, he declared, be passive, which 
should probably be read as not in favor. (About the only visible 
Diponegoro involvement in the whole affair was the fact that 
Nasution sent arrested Siliwangi officers to Jogjakarta for inter­
rogation, evidently to avoid demonstrations or attempts to rescue 
them in West Java.) Kemal Idris asserted the backing of Terri­
tory V--where Sudirman, who had commanded the Brawidjaja Division 
since the October 1952 affair, had recently been replaced. That 
there may have been considerable Brawidjaja support for a move 
against Nasution is also indicated by the particular stress paid 
by Nasution on winning Brawidjaja favor at the end of the year.
He went to Kediri to attend the Brawidjaja's anniversary celebra­
tion, taking with him Colonels Sungkono, Suhud and Kretarto from 
army headquarters --perhaps as proof that opposition in the 
October 17 Affair no longer counted, as these had all fought him 
then. Colonel Sarbini, speaking for the Brawidjaja Division, 
emphasized that there was a considerable difference of opinion in 
the Brawidjaja, and particularly among its officers, as to the 
means of dealing with the national situation. Sin Po, December 
19, 1956.
Kemal Idris did not mention Territory VI (Kalimantan), and, 
indeed, only its panglima, Abimanju, appeared be on the Lubis 
side; Territory VII (East Indonesia) was, he assured his officers 
(again probably correctly), on the anti-Nasution side. Bintang 
Timur, November 23, 1956.
54. Organisasi Keamanan Desa, Village Security Organization. Particu­
lar attention had been paid to organizing this in West Java 
because of the Darul Islam revolt, but it existed elsewhere under 
various titles. As of 1957, there were 80,000 members in West 
Java; their costs were borne by their villages but their orders 
came from the army, which also kept generally firm control over 
the issue of weapons. PIA bulletin, October 26, 1957.
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power or to replace a commander from below involved a barracks dip­
lomacy that allowed almost no room for bloodshed. If there was actual 
fighting between troops, honor and sentiment might make it impossible 
for a unit to back down or reverse alliances once any of its members 
had been killed. Moreover, a commander could not risk humiliating 
his men too greatly or often and expect to keep their loyalty; hence 
it was wise, if possible, to use civilians for the more controversial 
aspects of one's activity, and particularly for guarding positions 
that might have to be given up. Finally, it was advisable to involve 
civilian groups in more controversial public activity, for if later 
the army commanders on both sides negotiated an agreement, the blame 
for breach of the public order could be placed on the civilians' 
getting out of hand (as they were likely to do with the least en­
couragement, their expectations being of a more millenial sort than 
the military commanders'). Armed civilians were, in short, a kind 
of insurance in a coup situation; they were used in this capacity 
by dissident officers of various ideological persuasions, without 
very much regard for the political affiliation of their members as 
long as they could be thought reliable in the immediate circumstances.55
Kemal Idris' appeal to his anak buah was received favorably, 
but the attempt failed, evidently for much the same reason as his 
earlier one had. Kemal was reportedly in something of a panic after 
the affair, and indeed the next day Suprajogi moved to relieve him 
and Suwarto of their duties. But in fact it was to be another month 
before they were actually replaced. Their position was bolstered 
not only by the opinion of their subordinates but also by the fact 
that Nasution's recent actions were now rather widely thought to be 
going too far. His October 4 order against political participation 
had been accompanied by the declaration that an ad hoc committee of 
investigation headed by a recently appointed ally of his would 
consider charges of corruption and political involvement throughout 
the army. As might be expected, this announcement created a con­
siderable stir in army circles, and it appears to have been one of 
the few times in the Lubis Affair that Nasution overstepped himself.
55. For an example of the use of village guard groups for the purposes 
of military politics, see John Smail, "The Military Politics of 
North Sumatra: December 1956-October 1957," Indonesia, No. 6 
(October 1968), pp. 160-165. The use of youth undergoing para­
military training at Halim air base by Lieutenant Colonel Untung's 
September 30th Movement at the time of the 1965 coup seems to 
have been governed by some of the above considerations. A 
striking instance of the extent to which this civilian recruitment 
for coup purposes could ignore political lines is provided by the 
mobilization of participants for the demonstration outside the 
presidential palace on October 17, 1952. A large portion of those 
brought in by army trucks had been picked up on their way to work 
and asked to participate in a demonstration to support Sukarno, 
to which they enthusiastically agreed. A good part of them 
belonged to Communist-controlled unions, which led to accusations 
that the Communists were secretly behind the move, and to agonized 
denials from Communist union leaders that this was so (see 
Harian Rakjat, October 20 and 22, denials by Djaswadi, chairman 
of the Sarekat Buruh Bea dan Tjukai, S. Darjono, information 
officer of the Serikat Buruh Pekerdjaan Umum, and Njono, 
secretary general of the SOBSI).
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On October 20, a conference of army leaders--panglima, general staff 
and heads of important corps--was held to discuss the situation; 
after a session that lasted all day, it announced that it had been 
agreed to dissolve the committee, as the problems it had been assign­
ed to deal with no longer existed.56
The meeting did not prevent Nasution from summoning Lubis him­
self, however, and, on November 7, the chief of staff called him to 
answer for his involvement in political affairs. There ensued two 
days of negotiations, in which Lubis attempted to demonstrate his 
superior position by a series of studied insults to Nasution's dele­
gate, Colonel Gatot Subroto. At a general staff meeting held on the 
second day of Lubis' resistance, it was at last decided that he was 
guilty of insubordination and should be arrested. Lubis was not, of 
course, .immediately sent off to prison; on the contrary, it was 
claimed that he went underground and could not be found.57 Meanwhile, 
however, various of his and Sukanda's adherents in central army in­
stallations in Bandung were summoned to Djakarta to "provide informa­
tion" on the Lubis case. One of them, Major Djaelani, head of the 
army paratroop regiment (RPKAD), refused to obey the summons. As 
Djaelani was popular with his staff and had considerable firepower 
at his command, his obstinacy presented a serious problem, and Gatot 
Subroto was again assigned to procure compliance with the summons.
He failed, and other officers were sent to see the major, but he 
still refused.58 He was, in fact, holding back so that he might com­
mit his forces to a coup that was scheduled to take place in Djakarta 
on November 16.
56. Sin Po, November 16, 1956, statement by army headquarters; see 
also Sin Po, October 22, 1956; and Ali-DPR. The meeting consisted 
of the panglima, including Colonel Sudirman, now in charge of the 
Brawidjaja expeditionary force in East Indonesia; the members of 
the General Staff; Colonel Sukanda Bratamenggala in his capacity 
as inspector of instruction and training; Colonel Surjosularso, 
governor of the national military academy (AMN); Colonel Mokoginta, 
director of the staff and command school (SSKAD); and Colonel 
Bahrun quartermaster general. This was evidently considered
at the time to be the senior group of army decision makers. The 
meeting affirmed that investigations of official misbehavior 
would be carried out by commanding officers and the military police 
and thus not directly by the high command.
57. See Merdeka, November 16, 1956; Sin Po, November 13, 1956. It was 
subsequently claimed, particularly by the Left, that Lubis could 
not be arrested because he enjoyed the protection of high 
politicians --usually the name of Burhanuddin Harahap, the Masjumi 
former prime minister, was mentioned. It seems unlikely that this 
was the main reason, whether or not succor was offered Lubis from 
that quarter, for Nasution would scarcely have countenanced 
civilian intervention in an intra-military affair of such gravity 
for army discipline. It is more probable that, with storm clouds 
already brewing in the officer corps regarding his moves against 
Lubis, he delayed the execution of the arrest order to avoid a 
coalition of army opinion against himself.
58. Ali-DPR; Sin Po, November 23, 1956.
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On the night of November 15, Major Djuhro, head of the Djakarta 
city command and a partisan of Lubis' cause, held meetings with 
several subordinate officers to prepare for an action that was to 
begin at 3:30 the next morning. The essential move, so the army 
later claimed, was to rest on units available in the capital, but an 
RPKAD force that would arrive later in the day would act as a tactical 
reserve and ensure continuing control of the city. The plan was, in 
the first stage, to kidnap Nasution and members of the general staff. 
Later, augmented by the RPKAD force and by Kemal Idris' men from 
Tjirebon, they would arrest unfriendly ministers and party leaders 
and create a general disturbance in the capital that would force the 
president to dissolve the cabinet and parliament and accept their 
terms for a reorganization of the government. The initial phase 
failed, due, we are told, to poor coordination.59 Meanwhile, however, 
the RPKXD force had left its headquarters in Batudjadjar, near 
Bandung, on schedule, and arrived at Krandji, where it was supposed 
to join Kemal Idris' force and receive orders to proceed to the 
capital. Instead, a courier from Djakarta reported the failure of 
the initial.move and asked them to await further instructions. By 
noon they began to get impatient; there was still no sign of the 
Tjirebon force, for that morning Kemal Idris had finally been forced 
to turn over his command, and the Ninth Regiment was lost to further 
dissident action. At 1:30 p.m. a messenger from Djakarta arrived, 
saying that in the evening there would be another attempt. But the 
RPKAD commander was by now thoroughly worried, and he replied that 
he intended to have his men back in Bandung by night. There obviously 
needed, he said, to be further planning, and he demanded full explana­
tions from the others as to the reasons for their failure to live 
up to their part.
In Djakarta, fires had broken out in army warehouses at about 
1:00 p.m.--the time when the RPKAD and Tjirebon forces were to 
arrive and the general disturbances to begin. Those involved in 
guarding the arms saw no way to rescue them but to spread them on 
the streets outside--the better, according to the original plot, 
to be available to civilians enlisted on the coup group side. In 
Bandung, the Front Pemuda Sunda was supposed, it was later claimed, 
to seize weapons and support a coup there, but the plan had been 
discovered in time by loyalist officers. There was much evidence 
of military activity in both cities, but a facade of business-as- 
usual was maintained. Nasution's first move, once it was evident 
that open action in the capital could not be avoided, was to meet 
with the heads of the government and the other services to secure
59. One suspects, particularly in view of Ali Sastroamidjojo's state­
ment that Nasution's agents had infiltrated the Djakarta forces 
(see below), that a major reason for the failure was that the 
chief of staff and his allies knew all the plans for the affair.
If that is so, it would seem likely that Nasution elected to allow 
the move to take place in order to be able to offer proof of the 
danger posed by Lubis and his allies and thus to secure intra­
army support for their removal. For relevant accounts of the 
Djakarta coup, see Ali-DPR; Berita Minggu, November 18, 1956; 
Berita Indonesia, November 21, 1956; Sin Po, December 7, 1956, 
reporting an army statement on the affair; Harian Rakjat,
November 17 and 20, 1956; Merdeka, November 20, 1956.
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their acknowledgement that this was an internal army affair, and that 
there would be no interference from outside in its settlement.60 He 
then flew to Bandung, ostensibly to open the new office building of 
the adjutant general's directorate. Militarily, his forces were clear­
ly on top, for as the initial coup moves failed and doubts began to 
arise among the more subordinate participants, they began to pay more 
heed to the arguments of the doubters in their own ranks--opponents 
who had often been primed long beforehand by agents of the central 
command.61 By evening, the commander of the Seventh Regiment (Djakarta) 
consigned all, his men to barracks in obedience to Nasution's command, 
and Djuhro, though furious, felt himself forced to go along. The 
next day, there was a demonstration with heavy weapons outside army 
headquarters, but all real action in Djakarta had ended.
There remained the removal of Djuhro and Djaelani, but the lat­
ter proved not so easy. Djaelani retired to his headquarters in 
Batudjadjar, and to this redoubt Nasution sent a series of emissaries 
calculated to impress him: three officers who had attended the staff
and command school (SSKAD) with him, then a high officer of Siliwangi 
origin (Colonel Sadikin, inspector general for territorial affairs), 
and then a comrade from revolutionary days. But Djaelani hardened 
his heart, and indeed received a secret visit from Lubis, with whom 
he developed yet another plan for action. On November 20, he met 
with his subordinate officers and told them of the new attempt, giving 
them 48 hours to make up their minds on participation and relying on 
their loyalty not to reveal the plot. The next morning, Djaelani 
appeared at the staff and command school in Bandung, followed shortly 
by a number of non-commissioned RPKAD officers who had the intention 
of arresting him. They had already captured their pro-coup officers 
back at•Batudjadjar, having decided to take things into their own 
hands to prevent another attempt at a coup.
This intrusion was most embarrassing, for the SSKAD was celebrat­
ing its anniversary; Sukarno was there to speak, and he took the 
occasion to declare that it was not the soldiers but the officers who 
had behaved badly. The army hierarchy did not share his view. If 
officers could occasionally be encouraged to revolt against their 
superiors in the interests of still higher command, the ultimate 
loyalties of those below officer rank were too uncertain to be per­
mitted to take similar action. Nasution immediately gave orders that 
everything should be done to prevent soldiers from taking action 
against their superiors, and a few days later all men of the RPKAD 
were inspected by Colonel Sadikin, representing the high command, who 
guided them in the proper understanding of recent events and had them 
reaffirm the Soldier's Oath and the Sapta Marga code of principles, 
which they were evidently considered to have broken.62
60. Sin Po, November 17, 1956.
61. Ali-DPR; and see Djuhro's statement on giving up his command, in 
Sin Po, November 30, 1956. It might be noted in this connection 
that Djuhro had only served about eight months in his post as 
head of the Djakarta city command, and therefore had not had time 
to acquire reliable personal support.
62. Harian Rakjat, November 27, 1956.
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But just as Lubis' coup effort was dissolving into these last 
frantic fragments, the whole question of the central command was re­
opened at the highest level. Other senior officers had suddenly 
come to realize that if the battle were viewed solely as a struggle 
between Nasution and the followers of an officer who had been de­
clared an outcaste, a purge of all non-Nasution men in key positions 
might be carried out on the argument that they were Lubis' clientele 
and involved in his coup. Nasution might therefore emerge from the 
affair in a very strong position indeed, unless he could be reminded 
of the general equality of the officer corps and of the collective 
nature of army policy decisions. For this, the Jogja Charter could 
be appealed to, for if it had once served to unite the army against 
government interference, it could also be used to illustrate and 
sanctify the collegial principle. Moreover, senior officers con­
sidered, there were some who were in a better position to defy 
Nasution than others, notably the panglima in the Outer Islands, 
some of whom would in fact find themselves under severe pressure from 
their subordinates and local civilian interests if they submitted 
too far to domination by Djakarta. Lubis himself had told Nasution 
in the course of refusing to obey his summons that he could see to 
it that Territories I and VI would break off relations with Djakarta. 
The latter, Kalimantan, was not so serious, as Abimanju was a new 
man in the post and had already alienated regimental commanders by 
not consulting them in making his gestures on Lubis' behalf; but if 
Simbolon decided to seize power in North Sumatra he could do so, 
with severe consequences both for the Djakarta government and for 
army unity. The situation seemed too dangerous to press, and yet 
it seemed Nasution intended to press it. As a result, his colleagues 
determined to check his course.
The officers attending the anniversary meeting at the SSKAD, 
which Djaelani had so precipitously interrupted, took the occasion 
to discuss the failings of the state and the armed forces and the 
possible means of overcoming them. At the gathering they decided, 
first of all, that whatever else might happen they must achieve 
unity in the army. There should, furthermore, be an "integral 
change" in the army leadership aimed at creating the desired unity 
through establishing a balance of factional power. The character 
of the leadership change should be decided collegially, on the 
basis of musjawarah (deliberation seeking the sense of the meeting) 
and in accordance with the Jogja Charter. As the chief SSKAD spokes­
man declared, "Our army and state, which at this time are filled with 
disappointed and explosive forces, cannot be handled by main force, 
by calling on authority, and by stressing military norms alone."63 
In other words, Nasution would have to back down, and perhaps he 
would have to go.
The declaration was particularly weighty in view of the prestige 
of the staff and command school, which was regarded as an intellectual 
and ideological center for the army. The ties that were established 
between officers while studying at the school were sufficiently 
strong that they could be used politically--we have seen Nasution
63. Waspada, December 18, 1956, quoting Lieutenant Colonel Slamet 
Ali Junus, official spokesman of the SSKAD. The school later 
was known by the initials Seskoad.
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attempt to do so in sending SSKAD colleagues to Djaelani, and, during 
the regional troubles in Sumatra the next year, he was to encourage 
graduates assigned to unreliable divisional commands to act as a 
loyalist bloc against dissident commanders and local IPRI associations. 
But the SSKAD Officer Corps--the association of staff, students and 
alumni of the school--offered a forum of opinion outside the army 
hierarchy, and it was thus bound to give more voice to dissident com­
manders and middle-rank officers than the high command cared to hear.
In short, although the SSKAD Officer Corps was more elite and "pro­
fessional" in character than the IPRI, it had much the same uses and 
disadvantages from the viewpoint of the high command. (Its fate was 
to be similar: although the school itself flourished after the end
of the regional rebellion, Nasution moved, once his position was 
strong enough, to see that the Officer Corps ceased to act as a col­
lective spokesman.)
The members of the SSKAD, however superior they may have felt 
their qualifications, were not confident their voice alone would be 
accepted throughout the army, and so they stressed the right of the 
officer corps as a whole to decide the issue of army leadership.
Nor was the SSKAD group the only one to appeal to broader officer 
opinion. On November 23, two days after the SSKAD meeting, Zulkifli 
Lubis sent an open letter to the Indonesian officers and the press 
in which he asked that the evidence for his insubordination be 
turned over to a representative gathering of officers, and he would 
be responsible to them alone.61* Soon thereafter, IPRI leaders met 
with the presidium of the SSKAD Officer Corps to work out a common 
plan of action. As a result of this, the IPRI wrote to both Nasution 
and Lubis, requesting their views on the way in which the affairs 
of state and the army could be improved in line with the principles 
of the Jogja Charter. Moreover, the IPRI secretary general, Colonel 
S. Parman, seems to have met with Lubis (who, we will remember, was 
officially in hiding) to discuss his position. The presidium of the 
SSKAD Officer Corps also sent a delegation to the army general staff 
to discuss the Corps' proposals for a settlement, demanding among 
other things that, by December 31 at the latest, there be a revision 
of the army leadership.64 5
Nasution seems to have been furious at this attempt to undo his 
work, and particularly at the effort to place Lubis and himself on 
the same level. He replied to the IPRI letter that he would answer 
only to his superiors for his policy, being willing enough to acknowl­
edge the authority of a civilian government that gave him full back­
ing. Parman and other IPRI leaders were called into army headquarters 
and interrogated, and the IPRI presidium issued a statement declaring 
that it had not intended to imply that Nasution was responsible to it. 
As for the SSKAD, it was possible to undermine its position from 
below: The senate of students then at the school expressed its dis­
tress at the demands of the Officer Corps and said it had not been 
sufficiently consulted in the matter--a viewpoint possibly connected 
with the fact that the chairman and secretary of the senate had just
64. Merdeka, November 26, 1956.
65. Waspada, January 3, 1957; see also Merdeka, December 15, 1956; 
Sin Po,~ December 12, 1956, for accounts of the IPRI and SSKAD
moves.
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been appointed by Nasution to head the Djakarta city command.66
Nasution did indeed carry out a change in the army leadership, 
but it was by appointing a general staff of his own choice.67 He was 
in a position to do so, for the events of the Lubis Affair had left 
him in control of those military forces that were capable of acting 
effectively at the center. In the Siliwangi Division, the principal 
leaders of resistance had been removed and arrests and transfers were 
taking place at an increasing tempo, so that Nasution could look 
forward to the creation of a force he could rely on--as indeed he 
could rely on the Siliwangi for the remainder of his military career. 
The RPKAD had just been put under the command of one of his own men, 
and a "correction" was being carried out to ensure its reliability.
The Djakarta city command was now also in favorable hands. Lubis' 
supporters in the various central corps and institutes were being 
rooted out, and other dissidents, as they realized Nasution's 
determination and their immediate helplessness, quickly decided 
that discretion was after all called for in such matters.
It was because the game was up at the center that the focus of 
action in the struggle for control of the army now began to move 
away from Djakarta. In the Outer Islands, powerful panglima were 
still capable of resisting the high command's claims, and the course 
of events in the Lubis Affair convinced them that Nasution would not 
stop short of breaking their power. Moreover, it showed them that 
if they were going to resist they would have to do so credibly--to 
threaten, and be willing to carry out, a break with Djakarta. Not 
all, of course, were in a position to do so. The once fiery Abimanju, 
having seen Lubis' effort crumble and aware of his own lack of local 
support, announced that Lubis' threat that Kalimantan would reject 
central control was nonsense. "We are not," he loyally stated, "so 
easily persuaded to submit to the will of Colonel Lubis."68 A few 
days later, he presented himself in Djakarta for interrogation by 
the chief of staff.
Simbolon, however, was in an excellent position to resist, and 
so were others. On November 24, the North Sumatra commander left
66. These were Major Endang Dachjar and Captain Marsudi. Dachjar re­
placed Djuhro on November 29, after the collapse of the Djakarta 
coup effort. Other considerations influencing student opinion 
were their dependence on the central command for placement after 
their SSKAD assignment and their freedom while at the school from 
immediate pressures from subordinates and local civilian interests.
67. These were: Colonel Jani as Deputy I, replacing Colonel Kartakusuma 
and serving concurrently as Assistant II; Colonel Ibnu Sutowo as 
Deputy II, replacing Abimanju and serving concurrently as 
Assistant IV; and Colonel Dahlan Djambek as Deputy III, replacing 
Colonel Mursito; the change was announced on December 17, 1956.
The doubling up of offices may have been in order to keep out men 
Nasution could not rely on until he could put in people he wanted 
but who were too controversial or were needed temporarily else­
where. He hoped to use Dahlan Djambek for mediation with dis­
sident Sumatran forces, but in the end Djambek elected to join
the rebels.
68. Harian Rakiat, December 19, 1956, Abimanju statement on return- 
ing to Djakarta.
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Medan for Djakarta, ostensibly to discuss his still pending replace­
ment with Nasution. On his way he stopped at Padang in western 
Sumatra, to attend a reunion of officers of the former Banteng Divi­
sion. This revolutionary force had been dissolved as part of the 
rationalization program that had preceded the October 17 Affair, and 
its members had been demobilized or dispersed among other units. 
Agitation by those assigned outside Sumatra had been one of the 
military issues in which parliament became involved preceding the 
Affair, and, in 1953, there was a mutiny by members of one battalion 
whose demands to return home still had not been met.69 In the years 
following, rising regional feeling combined with soldiers' and 
veterans' discontent to produce a movement demanding that West Sumatra 
again have an army division of its own. Nasution's return to office 
did not promise well for this ambition, for the Banteng Division's 
ex-members knew too well that his Sumatran origins would not keep 
him from pursuing a centralist line at their expense.
The military sponsors of the Banteng Division reunion were the 
leaders of the Fourth Regiment, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad 
Husein, whose aim was to withdraw their force from subordination to 
the North Sumatra command and set themselves up as an independent 
divisional leadership. Simbolon, as North Sumatra commander, stood 
to lose by their defection, but he evidently regarded the Fourth 
Regiment's withdrawal as inevitable and not injurious to his principal 
territorial concerns, while at the same time it offered a new and 
powerful possibility for military resistance to Nasution's consolida­
tion of power. Consequently, Simbolon was not at all disturbed by 
the proceedings of the reunion, which formed a junta, the Banteng 
Council, to implement unilaterally its demands for regional autonomy 
and the replacement of Djakarta's political and military leadership.70 
On the contrary, the reunion strengthened his hand for negotiating 
in the capital, where he presented to Nasution and the chiefs of 
staff of the other services his objections to the treatment of 
Zulkifli Lubis.
One wonders whether at that point either Simbolon or Nasution 
still cherished hopes that a suitable arrangement for Simbolon's 
transfer of command could be reached.71 Perhaps they had some hope
69. This was the Pagar Rujung Battalion, which had been absorbed into 
the Siliwangi Division as Battalion 327. In 1953, its members 
went, in effect, on strike, and were disarmed on command of the 
panglima, Colonel Kawilarang. See Trompet Masjarakat, May 18, 
1953.
70. For the text of the Banteng Division statement, see Peristiwa
Sumatera Barat. Kronik Dokumentasi (Djakarta: Departemen 
Penerangan, 1960), Djilid I, pp. 3-4. It is clear from the state­
ment that, from the viewpoint of the meetings' participants, the 
primary goal was to achieve Nasution's removal. The first demand 
read: "Carry out as quickly as possible progressive and radical
improvements in all fields, especially in the Leadership of the 
Army, and subsequently in the Leadership of the State, with due 
consideration to the unity of the Republic." (p. 3).
71. Feith (Decline, p. 525) is of the opinion that the matter seemed 
settled, with only the exact date of transfer undecided; and army 
headquarters sought to give this impression at the time. The
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of persuading each other of the seriousness of their intentions and 
of the necessity for the other to give ground. If so, neither was 
successful; too much in terms of prestige and power was at stake, 
and too many other forces, military and civilian, were pressing 
against concessions. After a day, Simbolon returned to Medan, there 
to resume leadership of the dissident officers' movement, which had 
been given great impetus by the return of North Sumatra officers who 
had attended the SSKAD reunion and had partaken of its alarm at 
Nasution's-march to power. Nasution, for his part, battened down 
for the coming storm by sending emissaries to the other military 
territories to persuade their officers to stay with the central 
command by promising the massive promotion of middle-rank officers, 
and by announcing the intended large-scale purchase of arms and 
equipment.
On December 20, the Banteng Council formally seized control over 
government in West Sumatra. Two days later, Simbolon followed suit 
with the formation of a junta and the seizure of power in North 
Sumatra; the central government and the high command took up the 
challenge, and there began the series of intricate military and 
civilian maneuverings that was to end in the regional rebellion 
of 19 58.72 In the agitation accompanying these moves, much was made 
by military as well as civilian leaders of ethnic identification, 
religion and ideological position in an effort to rally popular 
support for their claims to power. However, although the military 
protagonists were not without views on these issues--sometimes very 
strong ones--most of them did not lose sight of the fact that, for 
them, the issue was to determine who would control the high command 
and how much authority he would have over his fellow officers. It 
was a matter worth much maneuvering, but it was not really worth a 
war. Threats, intramural coups and seizures of governmental control 
were forgivable in the long run and if alliances changed, but 
shedding the blood of fellow army men went strongly against the 
spirit of the guild, and the officer who was held to have done so 
unnecessarily was not likely to be rehabilitated if he lost or 
trusted if he won. The same ground rules that had kept Kemal Idris 
from trespassing on the territory of Regiment 8 on the way to his 
coup in Djakarta kept most rebel commanders from giving serious battle 
to the invading Djakarta troops and kept the high command from assum­
ing the unforgiving line which Djakarta political leaders urged 
towards the rebels. Civilians were not so fortunate, either at their 
own or at military hands, but, within the army, violence was re­
stricted, the decisive victories being won by successfully playing 
off military factions within rebel commands and by presenting a
plethora of favorable rumors on the subject may, however, have 
been inspired to pressure Simbolon into acceding, a not un­
familiar tactic in urging the transfer of an officer unwilling 
to give up his post. It is also possible, however, that 
Simbolon did not wholly make up his mind to defy Nasution until 
he arrived back in Medan and found very strong local backing 
for a move against the center.
72. For a treatment of the intra-military maneuverings in one 
critical area in this period, see John Smail, "The Military 
Politics of North Sumatra," pp. 128-186.
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prompt and credible show of central force in the dissident areas.
This mildness did not mean the high command won only half a 
victory in suppressing the rebellion; on the contrary, its primary 
goal of achieving strong central control was now at last to be 
realized. In part this triumph rested directly on the defeat of the 
most powerful Outer Island commands, the disgrace of Nasution's main 
rivals for leadership and the simultaneous enhancing of his own 
prestige. It also resulted from the working out of other projects, 
some of which had been initiated by Nasution soon after his reappoint­
ment in 1955 and others which were brought into being in the course 
of the next few years. The ensuing radical improvement of central 
control meant that debate on the policies and leadership of the high 
command became restricted to a small group of senior officers, and 
even these were clearly the subordinates and not the equals of those 
officially at the army's head. Thus able to present a monolithic face 
to the outside, the army was less vulnerable to manipulation by 
civilians even though its role in civil affairs expanded rapidly. But 
in the longer run, the suppression of debate within the army meant 
that dissatisfaction within the still heterogeneous and turbulent 
corps sought expression in alliances outside, with other services and 
with the civilian leadership, whose relations with the high command 
grew more tense as the army leaders grew more powerful. At the same 
time, the construction of a military instrument that would ensure 
continuing central control over the regional commanders produced a 
force which was to acquire a life and ambitions of its own and 
eventually to pose the most serious threat to the established army 
leadership. The following sections will deal with the means by 
which Nasution and his allies endeavored to institutionalize their 
control and by which they eventually worked their own replacement.
